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INTRODUCTION 
enny Morrill, a mother and former arts administrator, has been 
battling ovarian cancer since 2007.1 When she recently went to her 
scheduled chemotherapy treatment, the hospital presented her with 
both good and bad news.2 The good news was that she was 
responding well to the prescribed chemotherapy drug, Doxil.3 The 
bad news was that due to nationwide shortages, the hospital had no 
more Doxil to give her.4 Ms. Morrill said her “jaw dropped.”5 In 
describing her health predicament, Ms. Morrill said, 
A lot of things can go wrong when you’re in cancer treatment—
your white count can go down, you can become too frail to get 
treatment, the chemo can stop working. One of the things you never 
consider is that treatment might just not be available. It’s like you’re 
out in the ocean and the guy on the lifeboat says, “Sorry,  they ran 
out of life rings.”6 
 
1 Roni Caryn Rabin, Drug Scarcity’s Dire Cost, and Some Ways to Cope, N.Y. TIMES, 
(Dec. 12, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/13/health/policy/the-personal-price       
-paid-for-shortages-of-doxil-and-other-drugs.html?pagewanted=all. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
J
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This scenario is playing out with increasing frequency, as Ms. 
Morrill and thousands of other cancer patients cannot get access to 
lifesaving medications. Doxil shortages began in 2011, when the 
manufacturer temporarily halted production to address Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) manufacturing and sanitation issues.7 The 
facility’s remediation efforts continued over the next two years.8 
During that time, the facility produced only seventeen of sixty-five 
expected batches of Doxil.9 Claiming required upgrades to restore full 
operation were too costly, the owner of the facility shut down 
production in 2013.10 The facility was the sole supplier of Doxil.11 
Adding to Ms. Morrill’s health predicament—the Doxil shortage will 
continue at least through 2014.12 
In the past five years, the number of drug shortages in the United 
States has nearly quintupled.13 The majority of shortages involve 
sterile injectables used to fight infectious diseases and treat cancer.14 
These complex drugs are produced in a concentrated market 
consisting of only a few manufacturers.15 Any disruption in supply 
can result in shortages that leave patients without access to lifesaving 
drugs.16 In some cases, the drugs are the only treatment for their 
condition.17 These shortages have been the result of many factors, 
 
7 Eric Palmer, Updated: J&J’s Doxil Shortage to Last Until at Least End of 2014, 
FIERCE PHARMA (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.fiercepharma.com/story/jjs-doxil-shortage       
-last-until-least-end-2014/2013-10-07. 
8 See id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Jef Feeley & Michelle Fay Cortez, J&J Says Boehringer Fight May Cause Cancer-
Drug Shortage, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10    
-01/j-j-says-boehringer-doxil-dispute-may-cause-shortage.html. 
12 Palmer, supra note 7. 
13 Rachel Wallach, Plenty of Demand, Hurting for Supply, CHANGING BUS. (Sept. 24, 
2014), http://changeinbusiness.johnshopkins.edu/blog/2014/09/24/plenty-of-demand          
-hurting-for-supply/. 
14 FDA, A REVIEW OF FDA’S APPROACH TO MEDICAL PRODUCT SHORTAGES 13 
(2011) [hereinafter FDA 2011 REVIEW], available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads 
/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/UCM277755.pdf; see also FDA, STRATEGIC 
PLAN FOR PREVENTING AND MITIGATING DRUG SHORTAGES 8 (2013) [hereinafter FDA 
2013 PLAN], available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/Drug 
Shortages/UCM372566.pdf. 
15 See FDA 2011 REVIEW, supra note 14, at 4. 
16 Id. at 11. 
17 See Permanent Discontinuance or Interruption in Manufacturing of Certain Drug or 
Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 65,904 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts 20, 310, 314, and 
600) (proposed Nov. 4, 2013) [hereinafter Discontinuance or Interruption]. 
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including product quality concerns, discontinuation of product lines, 
changes in supply and demand, and manufacturing problems.18 
In response to the serious effects these shortages have on public 
health, recent federal legislation attempts to address the drug shortage 
problem by focusing on manufacturers’ notification responsibilities.19 
This legislation authorizes the FDA to require manufacturers of 
lifesaving and life-supporting drugs to alert the Agency of impending 
shortages.20 While this requirement may alleviate some of the factors 
associated with drug shortages, the FDA receiving advance notice of 
shortages fails to address the underlying causes. 
Despite reoccurring drug shortages, manufacturers have not 
increased production of these lifesaving medicines. Using generic 
manufacturers as the lens, this Article explores the confluence of 
regulatory constraints and market forces behind the shortages. As 
noted in the Doxil example, shortages have occurred among branded 
pharmaceuticals; however, more than eighty percent of drugs in short 
supply are generic injectable medications.21 Understanding the unique 
aspects of the generic drug industry is critical to ending shortages. 
Part I of this Article provides an overview of current drug 
shortages and their impact on patient care and healthcare providers. 
Part II offers an economic analysis of the root causes of the drug 
shortages. Specifically, Section A provides background on the 
manufacturers who produce many of the drugs in shortage. This 
Section also examines how these drugs’ complex production 
processes affect manufacturers’ ability to meet increases in demand. 
Section B looks at unique features of the healthcare drug market and 
examines their influence on traditional notions of supply and demand. 
Section C explores the role market consolidations and healthcare 
reimbursement rates play in current shortages. This Section also 
expands the analysis to examine how Group Purchasing 
Organizations’ (GPOs) contract practices influence generic 
manufacturers’ production decisions. Section D focuses on the FDA’s 
role in current shortages. According to the FDA, a leading cause of 
 
18 FDA 2011 REVIEW, supra note 14, at 15–16 fig.4. 
19 Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics Act § 506C(a), 21 U.S.C. § 356c(a) (2012), amended by 
Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA), Pub. L. No. 112-
144, § 1001(a), 126 Stat. 993, 1099 (2012). 
20 Id. 
21 Alina Selyukh, Study Finds U.S. Drug Shortage Problem Concentrated, REUTERS 
(Nov. 14, 2011, 10:32 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/14/us-drugs-shortages 
-imshealth-idUSTRE7AD1CJ20111114. 
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drug shortages is quality problems at manufacturing sites that 
precipitate production disruptions.22 This Section challenges that 
notion. After examining FDA policy decisions, this Section posits that 
poor agency execution has helped to transform manageable facility 
improvements into the current drug shortage. Part III analyzes current 
legislative, regulatory, and industry efforts to address drug shortages. 
While these approaches may mitigate shortages, this Part concludes 
they do not go far enough. Part IV acknowledges that shortages will 
continue until it is profitable for generic manufacturers to maintain 
production levels sufficient to meet patient demand. Accordingly, this 
Part offers a multipronged approach that balances patient needs, 
regulatory safeguards, and manufacturer incentives in a manner 
sufficient to end drug shortages. 
I 
OVERVIEW OF THE DRUG SHORTAGE CRISIS 
A. The Current State of Drug Shortages 
According to the FDA Drug Shortage Index, there is a “shortage” 
of more than eighty medically necessary drugs.23 The FDA defines a 
“drug shortage” as a situation in which the total supply of all 
clinically interchangeable versions of an FDA-regulated drug is 
inadequate to meet the current or projected demand at the patient 
level.24 Some may be surprised to learn that, notwithstanding the 
United States’ free market economy and robust patient demand for 
lifesaving medicines, drug shortages are neither new nor decreasing. 
In 2005, there were sixty-one reported new drug shortages.25 By 
2011, that number had quadrupled to more than 250 new shortages.26 
 
22 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DRUG SHORTAGES: PUBLIC HEALTH 
THREAT CONTINUES, DESPITE EFFORTS TO HELP ENSURE PRODUCT AVAILABILITY 21 
(2014) [hereinafter GAO DRUG SHORTAGES], available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/670 
/660785.pdf. 
23 See Current and Resolved Drug Shortages and Discontinuations Reported to FDA, 
FDA, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/drugshortages/default.cfm (last visited Oct. 
11, 2014) [hereinafter Current and Resolved Drug Shortages]. 
24 See CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, DRUG SHORTAGE MANAGEMENT 
12 (2014), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms 
/StaffPoliciesandProcedures/ucm079936.pdf. 
25 FDA 2011 REVIEW, supra note 14, at 10 fig.1. 
26 GAO DRUG SHORTAGES, supra note 22, at 11–12 fig.2. It should be noted that drug 
shortage statistics vary depending on which entity is conducting the study. For example, 
the American Society of Health-System Pharmacists (ASHP) has a broader definition of 
drug shortage than the FDA definition. The ASHP takes into account all instances in 
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Drug shortages, however, typically continue for extended periods so 
the actual number of shortages at any point in time is often higher.27 
While the number of new shortages decreased in 2012, more than 300 
shortages remained active by the end of the year.28 
The majority of drug shortages have been concentrated among 
older generic sterile injectables.29 In 2011, the FDA published a study 
of 127 long-duration drug shortages that had significant public health 
implications.30 The study revealed that the three most common 
classes of drugs in shortage were oncology (28%), antibiotics (13%), 
and electrolyte nutrition drugs (11%).31 Recent shortages have been 
documented in “crash cart” medicines, which can be lifesaving drugs 
needed in emergency ambulatory centers while waiting for emergency 
medical staff to arrive.32 There are also ongoing shortages in 
outpatient chemotherapy drugs that must be administered within rigid 
timeframes of a few days or weeks to provide maximum patient 
benefit.33 
In 2011, an American Hospital Association (AHA) survey found 
that 99.5% of the 820 hospitals surveyed had experienced at least one 
drug shortage during the last six months.34 Forty-four percent 
reported having experienced 21 or more shortages during this same 
time, and 64% indicated that the shortages created significant patient 
risks.35 In a 2012 survey conducted by the American Society of 
 
which “a supply issue . . . affects how the pharmacy prepares or dispenses a drug product 
or influences patient care when prescribers must use an alternative agent.” Erin R. Fox et 
al., ASHP Guidelines on Managing Drug Product Shortages in Hospitals and Health 
Systems, 66 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY 1399, 1400 (2009). ASHP reported 211 drug 
shortages in 2010 compared to the FDA’s finding of 178. Sharona Hoffman, The Drugs 
Stop Here: A Public Health Framework to Address the Drug Shortage Crisis, 67 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 1, 3 (2012). 
27 FDA 2013 PLAN, supra note 14, at 8. Seventy-four percent of the drugs reported to 
the Drug Shortage Program in 2010 were sterile injectables. FDA 2011 REVIEW, supra 
note 14, at 13. 
28 FDA 2013 PLAN, supra note 14, at 8. 
29 FDA 2011 REVIEW, supra note 14, at 13. 
30 Id. at 13–15. 
31 Id. at 14–15 fig.3. 
32 FDA 2011 REVIEW, supra note 14, at 11; MINIMUM CRASH CART SUPPLIES AND 
DRUGS (BASED ON 2010 ACLS PROTOCOLS), https://www.ttuhsc.edu/provost/clinic/forms 
/ACForm2.03.A.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2014). 
33 FDA 2011 REVIEW, supra note 14, at 11. 
34 AHA SURVEY ON DRUG SHORTAGES, AM. HOSP. ASS’N 2, 4, available at www.aha 
.org/content/11/drugshortagesurvey.pdf. 
35 Id. at 5–8; see Drug Shortages: National Survey Reveals High Level of Frustration, 
Low Level of Safety, INST. FOR SAFE MED. PRACTICES (Sept. 23, 2010), https://www.ismp 
.org/newsletters/acutecare/articles/20100923.asp [hereinafter ISMP]. 
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Anesthesiologists, almost 98% of the 3063 members surveyed 
reported current shortages of at least one anesthetic.36 Of those, 96% 
indicated having to use an alternative drug, 50% had to change an 
anesthetic procedure because of the shortage, 7% had to postpone 
treatment, and 4% had to cancel procedures.37 Finally, the group 
purchasing organization (GPO) Premier Healthcare Alliance 
conducted a survey of 311 pharmacy experts representing 228 
hospitals.38 Of those surveyed, 89% reported drug shortages that may 
have caused a safety issue or medical error, and 80% reported that a 
drug shortage resulted in delay or cancellation of a patient care 
intervention.39 Behind these statistics are patients who are in need of 
drugs to provide required parenteral nutrition, address serious 
infections, and treat life-threatening diseases such as cancer. 
B. Effect of Drug Shortages on Patient Care and Healthcare 
Providers 
Drug shortages have had serious and immediate effects on patients 
and healthcare providers. The unavailability of lifesaving treatments 
has resulted in providers prescribing second-line alternatives.40 
Providers prescribe a specific drug for a number of reasons. In their 
medical opinion, the ordered drug is the most effective, has the fewest 
side effects, and is compatible with other medication the patient is 
taking.41 When healthcare providers are forced to use second-line 
alternatives, which may not be as effective as the first-line option, the 
risk of adverse reactions and errors increases.42 Shortages require 
 
36 2012 ASA Drug Shortage Survey Results, AM. SOC’Y ANESTHESIOLOGISTS (Apr. 17, 
2012), http://www.asahq.org/For-Members/Advocacy/Washington-Alerts/2012-ASA         
-Drug-Shortage-Survey-Results.aspx. 
37 Id. 
38 Coleen Cherici et al., Navigating Drug Shortages in American Healthcare: A 
Premier Healthcare Alliance Analysis, PREMIER 1, 3 (Mar. 2011), https://legacy 
.premierinc.com/about/news/11-mar/drug-shortage-white-paper-3-28-11.pdf. 
39 Id. at 3. 
40 Examining the Increase in Drug Shortages: Hearing on H.R. 2245 Before the 
Subcomm. on Health of the Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th Cong. 117 (2011) 
(statement of W. Charles Penley, Chair, Gov’t Relations Comm., Am. Soc’y of Clinical 
Oncology). 
41 See id.; C. Lee Ventola, The Drug Shortage Crisis in the United States: Causes, 
Impact, and Management Strategies, 36 PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 740, 750–51 
(2011). 
42 Maryn McKenna, Hospital Pharmacists Scrambling Amid Vast Drug Shortages: 
Emergency Physicians Between Roc and a Hard Place, 57 ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MED. 
13A, 13A–14A (2011); see AHA SURVEY ON DRUG SHORTAGES, supra note 34, at 8. 
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healthcare providers to redirect their therapeutic efforts from applying 
the optimum course of treatment to searching through alternative 
drugs to determine proper dosages and interactions with other 
medications.43 Sixty-nine percent of the AHA survey respondents 
indicated that shortages resulted in patients receiving a less effective 
drug, and thirty-five percent reported that patients have experienced 
adverse outcomes as a result of this treatment.44 
When healthcare providers are unable to use an alternative 
treatment option because the specified drug is the only available 
treatment for a particular illness, patients forgo treatment, and 
hospitals must ration the supplies they have.45 According to the AHA 
survey, seventy-eight percent of respondents reported rationing or 
restricting drugs.46 As one physician noted, when there is no 
alternative to a lifesaving drug, “I guess patients just have to die.”47 
In addition to the toll shortages have taken on patient care, an 
American Society of Health-System Pharmacists (ASHP) survey has 
estimated the financial toll of these shortages to the healthcare 
system. Pharmacists and pharmacy technicians reported devoting on 
average nine and eight hours a week, respectively, to drug 
shortages.48 This translates into estimated labor costs of $216 million 
per year.49 Added to these expenses are the higher prices hospitals 
and healthcare providers pay for alternative drugs, as well as shipping 
costs to ensure the drugs arrive in time.50 
As a result of drug shortages, some hospitals have resorted to 
purchasing lifesaving drugs on the “gray market.”51 This market 
consists of distributors who offer their short supply drugs to 
healthcare providers at exorbitant prices.52 The average markup is 
 
43 See AHA SURVEY ON DRUG SHORTAGES, supra note 34, at 14. 
44 Id. at 8. 
45 See Ventola, supra note 41, at 751. 
46 AHA SURVEY ON DRUG SHORTAGES, supra note 34, at 9. 
47 ISMP, supra note 35. 
48 Rola Kaakeh et al., Impact of Drug Shortages on U.S. Health Systems, 68 AM. J. 
HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY 1811, 1814 (2011). 
49 Id. at 1811. 
50 Joseph M. Hill & Cynthia Reilly, Can the United States Ensure an Adequate Supply 
of Critical Medications?, 1 FOOD & DRUG POL’Y F. 1, 5 (2011). 
51 Drug Shortages Blamed in at Least 15 Deaths, ASSOC. PRESS (Sept. 23, 2011, 6:55 
AM), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/drug-shortages-blamed-in-at-least-15     
-deaths/; see Coleen Cherici, Patrick McGinnis & Wayne Russell, Buyer Beware: Drug 
Shortages and the Gray Market, PREMIER 1, 1–2 (Aug. 2011), http://www.chcablog.com 
/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Gray-Market-Analysis-David-Edit.pdf. 
52 Fox et al., supra note 26, at 1401. 
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650% above normal prices.53 The cost for drugs used to treat 
critically ill patients and those needing anesthesia for surgery can be 
even higher.54 In 2011, a vendor offered to sell the generic 
antihypertensive drug Labetalol for $1200.55 According to a Buyer 
Beware report, this is a 4533% markup from the drug’s customary 
cost of $25.90 per dose.56 To combat shortages, U.S. hospitals will 
spend almost half a billion dollars in enhanced labor and inflated 
pharmaceutical costs.57 
In addition to paying exorbitant prices, hospitals acquiring drugs 
through the gray market have no guarantee of the drug’s quality.58 
Diverted drugs sold through the gray market may be diluted, expired, 
contaminated, or relabeled with the wrong information.59 In a study 
by the Institute for Safe Medication Practices, a patient safety 
advocacy group, more than half of the 549 U.S. hospitals 
acknowledged that they had purchased one or more prescription drugs 
from gray market vendors.60 Twelve percent reported side effects or 
other problems attributable to drugs supplied by the gray market.61 
There are several conflicting theories as to the cause of drug 
shortages. However, in the end, there is agreement on one key fact—
drug shortages persist, in part, because generic manufacturers are 
either unable or unwilling to supply drugs sufficient to meet current 
 
53 Cherici, McGinnis & Russell, supra note 51, at 2. 
54 See Drug Shortages Blamed in at Least 15 Deaths, supra note 51. 
55 Id.; Cherici, McGinnis & Russell, supra note 51, at 2; Omudhome Ogbru, Iabetalol, 
Normodyne, Trandate, MEDICINENET.COM, http://www.medicinenet.com/labetalol/article 
.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2014). 
56 Cherici, McGinnis & Russell, supra note 51, at 2; Drug Shortages Blamed in at 
Least 15 Deaths, supra note 51. 
57 Examining the Increase in Drug Shortages: Hearing on H.R. 2245 Before the 
Subcomm. on Health of the Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th Cong. 101 (2011) 
(statement of  Mike Alkire, Chief Operating Officer, Premier Healthcare Alliance). 
58 Cherici, McGinnis & Russell, supra note 51, at 4. Rep. Elijah Cummings, member of 
the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, introduced H.R. 5853, a bill 
which “includes several provisions to address weaknesses in the drug supply chain, deter 
price gouging, and improve drug safety and efficacy.” Investigation of the “Gray Market,” 
Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, http://democrats.oversight.house.gov 
/investigations/investigation-of-the-gray-market (last visited Oct. 15, 2014); Gray Market 
Drug Reform and Transparency Act of 2013, H.R. 1958, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013). 
59 Cherici, McGinnis & Russell, supra note 51, at 4–5. 
60 Gray Market, Black Heart: Pharmaceutical Gray Market Finds a Disturbing Niche 
During the Drug Shortage Crisis, INST. FOR SAFE MEDICATION PRACS. 1, 1–2 (Aug. 25, 
2011), http://www.ismp.org/Newsletters/acutecare/showarticle.aspx?id=3. 
61 Id. at 3. 
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patient and provider demand. The next Part explores some of the 
reasons for the shortages. 
II 
THE ECONOMICS OF THE DRUG SHORTAGES 
A. Role of Generic Manufacturers 
More than eighty percent of all drug shortages involve sterile 
injectables and generic brands.62 To understand why shortages are so 
frequent in these areas necessitates a closer examination of sterile 
injectable generic manufacturers and their production processes. The 
generic sterile injectable market is highly concentrated with seven 
manufacturers producing the vast majority of all the drugs.63 In fact, 
the majority of the production of a given sterile injectable is done by 
three or fewer manufacturers.64 A 2010 study of thirty-three 
injectable oncology drugs shows that for twenty-eight of the drugs, at 
least ninety percent of the total production unit sales were done by 
three or fewer manufacturers.65 If one refines the analysis down to 
specific drug classes, the concentration order increases. In 2008, Teva 
Pharmaceutical Industries held a sixty-eight percent market share of 
Bleomycin, a cancer drug.66 In the same year, Bedford 
Laboratories®, held a sixty-two percent market share of Cytarabine, a 
chemotherapy agent.67 
 
62 Most Products Are Injectables and Multi-Sourced Generics, IMS HEALTH, 
http://www.imshealth.com/portal/site/ims/menuitem.748f6639e159b2ab41d84b903208c22
a/?vgnextoid=8dbc6a9876493310VgnVCM100000ed152ca2RCRD (last visited Nov. 7, 
2014). 
63 KEVIN HANINGER, AMBER JESSUP & KATHLEEN KOEHLER, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
& HUMAN SERVS., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES OF DRUG SHORTAGES 6 (2011) 
[hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.], available at http://aspe.hhs.gov 
/sp/reports/2011/drugshortages/ib.pdf; GAO DRUG SHORTAGES, supra note 22, at 28; 
FDA, DRUG SHORTAGE WORKSHOP 43–44 (2011) [hereinafter DRUG SHORTAGE 
WORKSHOP], available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/NewsEvents/UCM2758 
01.pdf. 
64 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 63, at 6; see, e.g., GAO DRUG 
SHORTAGES, supra note 22, at 28 (noting that in 2008, three manufacturers made seventy-
one percent of all generic sterile injectable oncology drugs, and three manufacturers 
produced ninety-one percent of generic sterile injectable supplements). 
65 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 63, at 2, 6. 
66 Thomas, Sullivan, Drug Shortages, POL’Y & MED. (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www 
.policymed.com/drug-shortages/. 
67 Id. 
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To produce sterile injectables, each of these manufacturers operates 
a small number of highly specialized facilities.68 Production must 
take place in a “clean room” environment to assure that the drugs are 
sterile. In this context, sterile drugs are free of contamination from all 
microorganisms and visible matter.69 Many of these sterilized 
products require dedicated lines and specialized manufacturing 
equipment.70 As a result, there is limited production fungibility within 
the facilities.71 The production time for these drugs ranges from hours 
to weeks.72 
Given the highly specialized facilities required to produce sterile 
injectables, companies have chosen to meet growing demand by 
increasing production levels rather than expanding their 
manufacturing infrastructure.73 Manufacturers justify this production 
approach by balancing the cost of building redundancy into their 
facilities against the purported slim profit margins available in the 
injectable generic market.74 This has created an industry in which 
facilities are on tighter schedules—any need for facility repairs or 
equipment maintenance could cripple a manufacturer’s ability to 
maintain sufficient output levels to prevent a shortage.75 Inspection 
reports from key manufacturing sites indicate that several facilities 
experiencing current production shortages have been in continuous 
operation since the 1960s.76 These reports note that some facilities’ 
“manufacturing lines have undergone only limited upgrades during 
that time while running 24 hours a day, 7 days per week . . . .”77 In 
summary, much of the market for generic injections is highly 
concentrated and composed of manufacturers who have opted, in 
several cases, to meet demand by running aging production 
equipment at high capacity. Against this backdrop, we examine the 
 
68 See FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: STERILE DRUG PRODUCTS PRODUCED BY 
ASEPTIC PROCESSING–CURRENT GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICES 5–12 (2004) 
[hereinafter CURRENT GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICES], available at http://www.fda 
.gov/downloads/Drugs/.../Guidances/ucm070342.pdf. 
69 Id. at 5. 
70 See id. at 8–12. 
71 J. Woodcock & M. Wosinska, Economic and Technological Drivers of Generic 
Sterile Injectable Drug Shortages, 93 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 170, 
170–73 (2012). 
72 Id. 
73 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 63, at 8–12. 
74 See id. at 13. 
75 See id. 
76 Woodcock & Wosinska, supra note 71, at 173. 
77 Id. 
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economic underpinnings and generic manufacturers’ role in the 
current drug shortage. 
B. Underlying Conditions of the Shortage 
1. Market Forces–Inelasticity of Demand and Supply 
The unique nature of the healthcare market makes it particularly 
susceptible to drug shortages. In the majority of markets, shortages 
are rare because prices change to maintain equilibrium between the 
quantity of products supplied and the quantity demanded.78 For 
example, when a supply disruption reduces the availability of a 
product, prices increase, and consumer demand recalibrates.79 
By contrast, the prescription drug market is relatively inflexible 
and constrained in its ability to react effectively to demand and supply 
changes. Patient demand for these drugs is often unaffected by 
changes in price for two reasons.80 First, a majority of these drugs are 
medically necessary, which suggests that there are few substitutes.81 
Insufficient supplies generally do not precipitate a reduced demand 
for drugs because patients cannot control what illnesses they will 
suffer and the specific medications they require.82 Second, 
manufacturers are prevented from raising prices to influence demand 
because patient health insurance contracts typically pay providers 
using pre-negotiated payment rates.83 These pre-set rates do not allow 
manufacturers to alter prices during the contract term.84 
Price inelasticity is present on the supply side as well. Here, low 
price responsiveness influences manufacturer inventory decisions.85 If 
a manufacturer has a surplus of a particular oncology drug, there may 
be no market for it even at a highly discounted price.86 “Drugs have a 
limited shelf life and holding excess inventory is costly.”87 As noted 
in a recent industry report, this produces a scenario in which 
“manufacturers face an asymmetry of incentives: there is little cost     
 
78 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 63, at 3. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 4; Hoffman, supra note 26, at 6. 
81 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 63, at 4; Hoffman, supra note 
26, at 6; DRUG SHORTAGE WORKSHOP, supra note 63, at 25. 
82 Hoffman, supra note 26, at 6. 
83 Id.; U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 63, at 4. 
84 Hoffman, supra note 26, at 6. 
85 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 63, at 4. 
86 See id. 
87 Id. at 4. 
LEE (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/2015  8:20 AM 
2014] The Drug Shortage Crisis: When Generic Manufacturers “Just Say No” 367 
. . . of producing too little of one drug . . . , but a potentially high cost 
of producing too much of that drug.”88 Rather than carry excess 
product, manufacturers commonly use “just in time” inventory 
practices.89 Using this approach, facilities manufacture drugs in 
amounts calculated to satisfy current demand.90 While efficient from 
a manufacturing perspective, any sudden change in supply or demand 
could render a drug vulnerable to shortage.91 
Another feature of the sterile injectable market is that high front-
end costs, dedicated production lines, and strict regulatory 
requirements prevent new manufacturers from quickly entering the 
market to increase supply.92 It generally takes two to three years for a 
manufacturer to get FDA approval for a new production facility.93 In 
addition, raw materials for production are often difficult to source, 
must be validated by manufacturers, and require regulatory 
approvals.94 As a result of these factors, it generally takes years for 
the industry to expand capacity in response to an increase in 
demand.95 Moreover, if the increase in demand is expected to be 
temporary (i.e., a shortage due to a production line disruption), 
investments in increased capacity are unlikely to occur.96 
In the sterile injectable market, maintaining excess production 
capacity to meet unanticipated demand is an uneconomical business 
approach; it would result in a generic manufacturer having high costs 
compared to its competitors.97 In the highly competitive generic drug 
market, no generic manufacturer would choose this strategy unless it 
could receive a higher price in the market.98 As discussed in the 
 
88 Id. at 6; see also Woodcock & Wosinska, supra note 71, at 170–76 (While contracts 
generally place a penalty for failure to supply product, that penalty structure is the 
difference between the contracted rate and the rate that a provider must pay for an 
alternative source. Drug shortages generally do not trigger these clauses because there is 
often no alternative source.). 
89 FDA 2011 REVIEW, supra note 14, at 5–6, 21–22. 
90 Id. at 23, 32. 
91 Id. at 32. 
92 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 63, at 13. 
93 See Prescription Drug Shortages: Examining a Public Health Concern and Potential 
Solutions: Hearing of the Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 112th Cong. 18 
(2011) (statement of Sherry Glied, Assistant Sec’y for Planning and Educ., U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs.). 
94 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 63, at 19. 
95 See id. at 4. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
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following Section, Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) price 
controls forestall that possibility. 
2. Legislative Constraints 
The MMA has a significant effect on the profit margins for generic 
sterile injectable drugs. In pertinent part, the law changed the 
reimbursement system for physician-administered drugs under 
Medicare Part B.99 The MMA capped provider reimbursement at the 
actual average sales price (ASP) recorded in the market place plus a 
six percent markup, which is intended to cover the drug cost.100 Prior 
to the MMA, providers received ninety-five percent of the average 
wholesale price (AWP) for each covered drug.101 Despite the name, 
the AWP was not actually the average wholesale price, but rather the 
manufacturer’s suggested list price.102 In 2001, the Government 
Accounting Office (GAO) and Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) found that, under the AWP system, “Medicare 
overpaid for Part B drugs by over $1 billion” per year.103 Congress 
addressed the overpayment issue by including provisions in the MMA 
to change the Medicare reimbursement system.104 
In 2005, Medicare converted to the ASP-based reimbursement 
system.105 In practice, this limited manufacturer price increases for 
generic drugs to no more than six percent every six months “because 
raising the price more than that would cause reimbursement for the 
 
99 ACAD. OF MANAGED CARE PHARMACY, AMCP GUIDE TO PHARMACEUTICAL 
PAYMENT METHODS 10 (2007) [hereinafter AMCP GUIDE], available at http://www.amcp 
.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=9856. 
100 Michael P. Link, Karen Hagerty & Hagop M. Kantarjian, Chemotherapy Drug 
Shortages in the United States: Genesis and Potential Solutions, 30 J. CLINICAL 
ONCOLOGY 692, 693 (2012). 
101 COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, REIMBURSEMENT FOR PART B DRUGS: AVERAGE 
WHOLESALE PRICE REFORM 1 (2004) [hereinafter REIMBURSEMENT FOR PART B DRUGS], 
available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/healthdocs/awpreform.pdf. 
102 AMCP GUIDE, supra note 99, at 3. 
103 REIMBURSEMENT FOR PART B DRUGS, supra note 101, at 1. 
104 Id. at 2–3 (discussing changes in reimbursement for oncologists). 
105 Mireille Jacobson et al., How Medicare’s Payment Cuts for Cancer Chemotherapy 
Drugs Changed Patterns of Treatment, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1391, 1391 (2010); 2014 ASP 
Drug Pricing Files: ASP Drug Pricing Files October 2014 Update, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE 
& MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Part-B      
-Drugs/McrPartBDrugAvgSalesPrice/2014ASPFiles.html (last modified Sept. 9, 2014, 
3:51 PM) (stating that repayment amounts are “106 percent of the Average Sales Price 
(ASP) calculated from data submitted by drug manufacturers” with “quarter to quarter 
price changes”). 
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drug to be less than the actual selling price.”106 The ASP cap leaves 
little flexibility for prices to adapt to supply and demand.107 This 
hurts manufacturers because, in the generic market, drug prices can 
decrease quickly. As noted by former healthcare adviser to the Obama 
administration, physician Ezekiel Emanuel: 
In the first two or three years after a cancer drug goes generic, its 
price can drop by as much as 90 percent as manufacturers compete 
for market share. But if a shortage develops, the drug’s price should 
be able to increase again to attract more manufacturers. Because the 
2003 act effectively limits drug price increases, it prevents this from 
happening.108 
Because traditional notions of supply and demand do not apply to 
cancer drugs, the market cannot self-correct to address shortages.109 
Typically, the market would respond to increased demand with 
increased prices.110 “[T]he Medicare payment system has made it 
difficult to raise prices, creating a situation in which—for low-cost 
drugs with dwindling profit margins—there is little incentive for 
continued production.”111 This theory, along with a Department of 
Health and Human Services (DHHS) study that reviewed Medicare 
Part B volume of service data, suggests that drug shortages are likely 
to occur when a drug’s price falls.112 The study found that within “the 
group of drugs that eventually experience[d] a shortage, average 
prices decreased in every year leading up to that shortage. In contrast, 
the average prices of drugs that never experienced a shortage over this 
period did not change . . . .”113 
 
106 Link, Hagerty & Kantarjian, supra note 100, at 693. The MMA applied to all drugs 
administered in a provider setting. Id. 
107 See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Shortchanging Cancer Patients, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/07/opinion/sunday/ezekiel-emanuel-cancer          
-patients.html. 
108 Id. 
109 See id. 
110 See id. 
111 Link, Hagerty & Kantarjian, supra note 100, at 693. 
112 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 63, at 7. 
113 Id. at 8. The study 
found that 44 drugs with declining sales in 2006–2008 were in shortage in 
subsequent years, and 28 drugs with increased sales in 2006–2008 were never 
involved in a shortage. The study also found that the prices of 44 drugs in 
shortage had steadily decreased, while the prices of the 28 drugs whose supply 
was adequate did not change significantly. 
Hoffman, supra note 26, at 7–8. 
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The ASP reimbursement system also exerts price pressure on 
generic manufacturers because it incentivizes physicians to prescribe 
costly brand-name drugs over generics.114 Physicians who prescribe 
drugs that are more expensive receive a higher dollar amount than 
those who prescribe generics.115 For example, six percent of the 
cancer drug Abraxane, which sells for $5824, generates a 
significantly higher payment for a provider than six percent of the 
generic paclitaxel, priced at $312.116 
For nearly a decade, the MMA’s reimbursement system has 
applied a steady downward pressure on sterile injectables drug 
prices.117 In the short-run, these falling prices are favorable to 
patients and payers. However, when the cost of a drug falls below a 
certain price, patients can run the risk of manufacturers abandoning 
production in favor of more lucrative product lines.118 Consider the 
long-term viability of producing a one dollar sterile injectable cancer 
drug from a manufacturer’s perspective: faced with diminishing 
returns from low prices, manufacturers have a reduced incentive to 
remain in the market of generic sterile injectibles. As recent market 
activity suggests, fewer manufacturers choose to produce these 
drugs.119 With a limited number of manufacturers, any production 
line disruption magnifies the impact on the supply of product.120 
Currently, providers treat patients with lifesaving cancer drugs that 
cost less than a can of soda. In the end, this pricing scheme may not 
be economically viable for generic manufacturers. 
C. Exacerbating Economic Factors 
1. Business Decisions and Market Consolidations 
The MMA reimbursement policies and market forces described 
above influence generic manufacturers’ decisions regarding not only 
how much to produce, but where to sell their products. Some generic 
manufacturers have made the business decision to sell their products 
 
114 Mandy L. Gatesman & Thomas J. Smith, The Shortage of Essential Chemotherapy 
Drugs in the United States, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1653, 1653–54 (2011). 
115 Id. at 1654. 
116 Hoffman, supra note 26, at 7. 
117 BRIAN RYE, BLOOMBERG GOV’T, MEDICARE PRICE CONTROLS WORSEN DRUG 
SHORTAGES, BOOST GRAY MARKET 1, 6 (Oct. 1, 2012). 
118 Link, Hagerty & Kantarjian, supra note 100, at 693. 
119 See GAO DRUG SHORTAGES, supra note 22, at 28. 
120 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 63, at 13. 
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abroad rather than in the U.S. market.121 Medicare-type 
reimbursement caps do not exist in Europe, and generic drug prices 
are higher.122 As a result, generic drugs manufactured in the United 
States can be sold abroad at a higher profit.123 When manufacturers 
focus on more profitable markets, needed drugs are diverted to 
foreign countries.124 These business practices, in turn, contribute to 
drug shortages in the United States.125 
High production costs and comparatively low profit margins 
associated with sterile injectables have prompted generic 
manufacturers to reduce or discontinue production.126 In 2000, 
vaccines used against diphtheria and tetanus were in shortage because 
one manufacturer, citing low revenues, stopped.127 In the case of the 
cancer drug leucovorin, a generic manufacturer decided to stop 
production eight months after a brand-name version with a higher 
profit margin became available.128 For more than seventy years, 
several manufacturers have produced the cancer drug.129 In 2008, the 
FDA approved a patented active l-isomer of the generic drug.130 
Though the brand-name drug was no more effective than the generic, 
it was fifty-eight times more expensive than the thirty-two dollar 
generic.131 Prescriptions for the brand-name version of the drug 
became increasingly popular.132 Eight months after the FDA 
approved the branded version, there was a shortage of the generic.133 
The high manufacturing costs and insufficient financial return made it 
no longer in generic manufacturers’ business interests to continue 
production.134 
 
121 See Bruce A. Chabner, Drug Shortages—A Critical Challenge for the Generic-Drug 
Market, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2147, 2149 (2011). 
122 Link, Hagerty & Kantarjian, supra note 100, at 693. 
123 Chabner, supra note 121, at 2149. 
124 See id. 
125 See Hoffman, supra note 26, at 6. 
126 See Hill & Reilly, supra note 50, at 4. 
127 Fox et al., supra note 26, at 1401. 
128 Hoffman, supra note 26, at 6. 
129 Gatesman & Smith, supra note 114, at 1653–54. 
130 Id. at 1653. 
131 Id. at 1654. 
132 Hoffman, supra note 26, at 6. 
133 Id. 
134 See Gatesman & Smith, supra note 114, at 1653. 
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Industry consolidations have also affected the availability of 
drugs.135 When generic manufacturers combine, the merged entity 
often streamlines or transfers product lines to new facilities.136 These 
actions can result in a complete cessation of, or delays in, a drug’s 
manufacturing.137 In addition, if the two consolidated companies have 
a similar product line, often single-source productions result from the 
merger.138 “As the number of manufacturers of a product decreases, 
resiliency in the supply chain also decreases . . . .”139 The net result is 
that those drugs become more vulnerable to shortages.140 
Consolidations from 2007 and 2008 within the generic drug 
industry include Teva’s acquisition of Barr Pharmaceuticals141 and 
Mylan Pharmaceuticals’ acquisition of Merck’s KGaA generics.142 
Mergers of this type often result in competing financial interests 
within an organization that can affect availability of lower priced 
pharmaceuticals.143 A DHHS report indicates that mergers could 
considerably contribute “to drug shortages . . . if the consolidations 
have resulted in closures of manufacturing facilities that reduced 
production capacity.”144 As noted by Assistant Secretary of Health 
Howard Koh: 
Industry consolidation has also contributed to the drug shortage 
problem. . . . [W]hen a firm has a manufacturing or quality problem 
they will often voluntarily suspend production so they can identify 
and address the root cause of the product quality problem. . . . 
Consolidation has led to fewer firms making these drugs and the 
firms have a limited number of manufacturing lines. When one firm 
experiences a quality problem which results in production holds or 
 
135 Examining the Increase in Drug Shortages: Hearing on H.R. 2245 Before the 
Subcomm. on Health of the Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th Cong. 8 (2011) 
[hereinafter Statement of Howard K. Koh] (statement of Howard K. Koh, Assistant Sec’y 
for Health, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.). 
136 Fox et al., supra note 26, at 1401. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Shirley S. Wang, Teva to Buy U.S. Generic Rival Barr for $7.46 Billion, WALL ST. 
J. (July 19, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB121637960357665065. 
142 Press Release, Mylan Inc., Mylan Completes Acquisition of Generics Business of 
Merck KGaA (Oct. 2, 2007), available at investor.mylan.com/releasedetail.cfm?release 
id=406511. 
143 See Ventola, supra note 41, at 742. 
144 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 63, at 6. 
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slowdowns, the remaining firms are usually not able to make up the 
shortfall due to capacity constraints.145 
2. The Role of GPOs 
Currently, the GAO is investigating the extent to which GPOs 
contribute to ongoing shortages.146 GPOs are purchasing 
intermediaries that leverage the buying power of their members and 
negotiate contracts with manufacturers and vendors.147 In the 
healthcare setting, GPOs negotiate contracts with drug manufacturers 
on behalf of hospital groups and healthcare organizations.148 As the 
intermediary between manufacturers and hospitals, GPOs create value 
by reducing transaction costs and negotiating lower prices than a 
single hospital could achieve alone.149 GPOs derive a majority of this 
value (and their operating revenue) by charging drug manufacturers 
for contracting services.150 Referred to as “contract administrative 
fees,” these payments are on a percentage of each drug 
manufacturers’ GPO-negotiated contract sales.151 By law, this fee 
should not exceed three percent, but in special cases, GPOs have 
charged higher fees.152 GPOs can charge these fees through a “safe 
harbor” amendment to the Social Security Act’s “anti-kickback” 
statute.153 
 
145 Statement of Howard K. Koh, supra note 135, at 14. 
146 Jaimy Lee, Group Blames GPOs for Generic Drug Shortages, MODERN 
HEALTHCARE (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20130904/blog 
/309049998. 
147 GAO, GROUP PURCHASING ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL OVERSIGHT AND SELF-
REGULATION 1–2 (2012) [hereinafter GPO OVERSIGHT AND SELF-REGULATION], 
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/589778.pdf. 
148 Id. 
149 Kathleen E. McKone-Sweet, Paul Hamilton & Susan B. Willis, The Ailing 
Healthcare Supply Chain: A Prescription for Change, 41 J. SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT. 4, 8 
(2005). 
150 GAO, GROUP PURCHASING ORGANIZATIONS: USE OF CONTRACTING PROCESSES 
AND STRATEGIES TO AWARD CONTRACTS FOR MEDICAL-SURGICAL PRODUCTS 6 (2003) 
[hereinafter GROUP PURCHASING ORGANIZATIONS]. 
151 Id. at 2. 
152 Id. at 6; McKone-Sweet, Hamilton & Willis, supra note 149, at 8–9. 
153 GROUP PURCHASING ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 150, at 6. “The Anti-Kickback 
statute prohibits the knowing or willful solicitation, receipt, offer, or payment of fees, or 
other remuneration, to induce the purchase of an item or service for which payment may 
be made under a federal health care program.” GPO OVERSIGHT AND SELF-REGULATION, 
supra note 147, at 2 n.3 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2006)). 
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By 2011, more than ninety percent of all hospital purchases were 
made through GPO contracts.154 In the same year, the two largest 
GPOs, Novation and Premier, negotiated contracts worth 
approximately seventy billion dollars.155 The consolidation of GPO 
purchasing power has raised several policy concerns. In particular, 
contract provisions frequently used when negotiating with generic 
manufacturers have raised anti-competitive concerns.156 Most 
recently, these practices have been linked to drug shortages. 
GPO contracts are structured to take advantage of large economies 
of scale in drug production.157 In the sterile injectable market, this 
results in only a few large manufacturers producing each 
medication.158 “GPOs tend to favor large manufacturers since they 
have a wider variety of products and are financially capable of paying 
the contract fees.”159 In exchange for the administration fees, GPOs 
offer drug manufacturers a variety of contractual incentives that limit 
competition among sources of supply to their member hospitals.160 
The GAO indicates that GPOs frequently use sole-source contracts.161 
In such contracts, a GPO grants a generic manufacturer the exclusive 
right to offer its drugs to the GPO member hospitals.162 Other GPO 
contracts offer minimum volume purchase requirements to specific 
drug manufacturers.163 GPOs set the volume requirements at levels 
that essentially block smaller generic manufacturers from competing 
for these contracts.164 GPOs also offer select manufacturers bundling 
arrangements.165 In these contracts, GPO member hospitals can 
purchase combinations of products from specific manufacturers. The 
manufacturer benefits from these arrangements through increased 
sales from items that may not generate adequate revenue as stand-
 
154 Roger D. Blair & Christine Piette Durrance, Group Purchasing Organizations, 
Monopsony, and Antitrust Policy, MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. (2013). 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 See id. 
158 COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM, 112TH CONG., FDA’S CONTRIBUTION 
TO THE DRUG SHORTAGE CRISIS 10 (2012) [hereinafter COGR 2012 REPORT]. 
159 McKone-Sweet, Hamilton & Willis, supra note 149, at 9. 
160 See id. at 8–9. 
161 GROUP PURCHASING ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 150, at 3, 11–12. 
162 Id. at 5; Blair & Durrance, supra note 154. 
163 COGR 2012 REPORT, supra note 158, at 10; GROUP PURCHASING ORGANIZATIONS, 
supra note 150, at 5. 
164 COGR 2012 REPORT, supra note 158, at 10. 
165 GROUP PURCHASING ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 150, at 3. 
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alone items.166 As noted in the GAO report, in each of these 
instances, there is a tendency for one manufacturer to thrive while 
rivals are either marginalized or excluded entirely from the market.167 
In 2012, a House Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform (House Committee) report indicated that these GPO practices 
contribute to the current shortage of generic injectable medications.168 
Because GPO networks are a guaranteed source of demand, drug 
manufacturers compete aggressively for GPO contracts.169 As 
previously noted, GPOs favor drug manufacturers who can produce 
drugs in high volumes because economies of scale in drug 
manufacturing result in declining average costs as the amount of 
production increases.170 The heightened competition among 
manufacturers to obtain GPO contracts drives prices down.171 As a 
result, however, the House Committee report notes, “companies that 
cannot produce a drug at large enough output levels to take advantage 
of the economies of scale . . . will stop producing the drug or will 
neglect to enter the market.”172 These practices contract the market. 
In contracted markets dominated by single-source suppliers, drugs are 
more vulnerable to shortage.173 
Critics contend that these exclusive contracting provisions have 
given GPOs monopolistic control over the industry, and they 
jeopardize market competition.174 In response to these concerns, six 
senior members from the House of Representatives turned to the 
GAO to determine whether GPO contract practices and safe harbor 
administration fees are a “‘driving cause’” of drug shortages.175 The 
GAO report is due out in 2014.176 
 
166 Id. at 6. 
167 Id. 
168 COGR 2012 REPORT, supra note 158, at 4. 
169 Blair & Durrance, supra note 154, § 4. 
170 See RYE, supra note 117, at 6; COGR 2012 REPORT, supra note 158, at 10. 
171 COGR 2012 REPORT, supra note 158, at 10. 
172 Id. at 4. 
173 Ventola, supra note 41, at 749–50. 
174 Some MDs Blame GPOs for Chronic Drug Shortages, PHARAMACY PRAC. NEWS 
(June 2013), http://www.pharmacypracticenews.com/ViewArticle.aspx?d=Policy&d_id 
=51&I=June+2013&i_id=964&a_id=23481. 
175 Id. 
176 Lee, supra note 146. 
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D. The FDA’s Role in Drug Shortages 
According to a report published by the FDA, quality problems at 
generic manufacturing facilities, which resulted in supply disruptions 
of lifesaving medicines, caused current drug shortages.177 The report 
further notes that, while product disruptions and other primary causes 
of drug shortages “lie outside the purview of FDA . . . , the Agency 
has taken on the task of working with manufacturers to prevent and 
mitigate such shortages.”178 The FDA report, however, 
mischaracterizes both the leading cause, and the Agency’s role, in the 
current drug shortages. 
The root cause of current shortages can be traced back to 2009, 
when President Barack Obama appointed Dr. Margaret Hamburg 
FDA Commissioner.179 Her appointment followed news that 
contaminated batches of a sterile injectable, heparin, were linked to 
more than eighty deaths in the United States from 2007 to 2008.180 As 
the new commissioner, Hamburg made preventing contaminated 
drugs a top priority.181 Specifically, she announced that “[t]he FDA is 
fortunate to have received significant funding increases for the current 
and next fiscal year that will be devoted to additional inspection and 
compliance activities that will support the elements of an effective 
enforcement strategy that I have outlined.”182 
Due to the FDA’s new policy of increased inspection and 
compliance oversight, four of the United States’ five largest generic 
injectable manufacturers simultaneously commenced remediation 
efforts.183 As part of addressing issues raised in FDA warning letters, 
all of the recipients temporarily halted production.184 When 
 
177 FDA 2011 REVIEW, supra note 14, at 15. 
178 Id. at 8. 
179 Press Release, White House, President Barack Obama Announces Key FDA 
Appointments and Tougher Food Safety Measures (Mar. 14, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Weekly-Address-President-Barack-Obama   
-Announces-Key-FDA-Appointments-and-Tougher-F/. 
180 RYE, supra note 117, at 6. 
181 Margaret A. Hamburg, Comm’r, Food & Drug Admin., Remarks on Effective 
Enforcement and Benefits to Public Health at the Food and Drug Law Institute (Aug. 6, 
2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/ucm175983.htm. 
182 Id. 
183 COGR 2012 REPORT, supra note 158, at 16. 
184 See id. An FDA warning letter is: 
[A] correspondence that notifies regulated industry about violations that FDA has 
 documented during its inspections or investigations. Typically, a Warning Letter 
 notifies a responsible individual or firm that the Agency considers one or more 
 products, practices, processes, or other activities to be in violation of the Federal 
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explaining these concurrent production stoppages to Congress, the 
FDA stated that they were voluntary manufacturer decisions.185 
However, given the explicit threat contained in FDA warning letters 
(“[f]ailure to promptly correct these violations may result in legal 
action without further notice including, without limitation, seizure and 
injunction”),186 the “voluntariness” of such action is questionable. 
By February 2012, fifty-eight percent of the drugs in short supply 
were manufactured by one or more of the facilities that had received a 
warning letter from the FDA and were undergoing remediation 
efforts.187 Under Hamburg’s direction, FDA agents increased their 
efforts in conducting facility inspections and issuing citations.188 
According to the House Report, these field agents did not believe it 
was their responsibility to consider the implications of their increased 
enforcement action, even if it resulted in production disruptions, 
facility closures, and eventual shortages.189 
A troubling aspect of the FDA’s heightened enforcement strategy 
was that, in some instances, the validity of the allegations in the 
warning letter was questionable. The FDA conducted three separate 
investigations of a Sandoz manufacturing plant in Québec during 
2011.190 In November 2011, the Agency issued a warning letter citing 
possible contamination of some of Sandoz’s sterile injectable 
 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act), its implementing regulations and other 
federal statutes. Warning Letters should only be issued for violations of 
regulatory significance, i.e., those that may actually lead to an enforcement 
action if the documented violations are not promptly and adequately corrected. A 
Warning Letter is one of the Agency’s principal means of achieving prompt 
voluntary compliance with the Act. 
FDA, Procedures for Clearing FDA Warning Letters and Untitled Letters, in 
REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL–JULY 2012 § 4.1 (2012), available at http://www 
.fda.gov/downloads/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/RegulatoryProceduresManual/UCM1769
65.pdf. 
185 COGR 2012 REPORT, supra note 158, at 18. 
186 Letter from Alonza E. Cruse, Dist. Dir., FDA, to Teva Parenterals Medicines, Inc. 
(Dec. 11, 2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/Warning 
Letters/ucm209222.htm. 
187 COGR 2012 REPORT, supra note 158, at 5, 18. 
188 See id. at 16, 18. 
189 Id. at 18–19. 
190 Sandoz Suspends Some Drug Production After U.S. Warning, GENERICLICENSING 
.COM, http://genericlicensing.com/news/view/146 (last visited Oct. 15, 2014) [hereinafter 
Sandoz Suspends Some Drug Production]; Letter from Steven Lynn, Acting Dir. of Pub. 
Health Serv., FDA, to Joseph Jimenez, Chief Exec. Officer, Novartis International AG, 
available at http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/Warning Letters/ucm281843 
.htm. 
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drugs.191 The Canadian drug authority conducted a separate 
inspection soon thereafter and identified no problems.192 Faced with 
possible FDA sanctions, however, Sandoz decided to scale back 
production of several drugs while addressing Agency concerns.193 
Sandoz’s experience of having no identifiable problems is not 
uncommon. During the House Committee’s investigation of the 
FDA’s role in drug shortages, it found no “evidence that any products 
produced . . . at the facilities undergoing remediation had harmed 
anyone beyond typical side effects associated with any type of 
medication.”194 
The House Committee’s finding does not dispute that many of the 
facilities were older and that upgrades were preferable.195 However, 
as pointed out by former FDA Deputy Commissioner and senior 
official at CMS, Dr. Scott Gottlieb,196 the FDA has largely 
contributed to the drug shortage crisis with inflexible and outdated 
policies: 
With its vigilance heightened, the FDA has required manufacturers 
to undergo major plant renovations, suspend facilities or stop 
shipping goods from suspect production lines. The FDA and the 
manufacturers often don’t understand the drug-production processes 
well enough to detect the root cause of problems. Instead of calling 
for targeted fixes of troubled plants, the agency has often required 
manufacturers to undertake costly, general upgrades to facilities.197 
Between fiscal years 2009 and 2011, the number of FDA-issued 
warning letters increased by 250%.198 Compliance with the warning 
letters essentially required all U.S. manufacturers of sterile injectables 
to remediate their facilities at the same time, causing their available 
capacity to reduce by thirty percent in comparison to capacity in 
2009.199 This created a vacuum in the generic drug market which, due 
to the highly complex manufacturing processes, could not be filled 
 
191 Sandoz Suspends Some Drug Production, supra note 190. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
194 COGR 2012 REPORT, supra note 158, at 18. 
195 Id. at 20. 
196 Drug Shortage Crisis: Lives Are in the Balance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Health Care, 112th Cong. 25, 28–29 (2011) (statement of Scott Gottlieb, resident fellow, 
American Enterprise Institute). 
197 Id.  
198 COGR 2012 REPORT, supra note 158, at 19. 
199 Id. at 18. 
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immediately.200 For facilities with genuine manufacturing problems, 
the FDA could have directed facilities to make targeted improvements 
carried out over a timeframe that would have significantly diminished 
the public health crisis the country is now facing from drug shortages. 
Perhaps in recognition that its enforcement strategy was 
contributing to drug shortages, the FDA revised its warning letters. 
The letters now include the following directive: 
If as a result of receiving this Warning Letter or in general, you are 
considering making a decision that will result in a decreased 
number of finished drug products or active pharmaceutical 
ingredients produced by your manufacturing facility, FDA requests 
that you contact CDER’s Drug Shortages Program immediately, as 
you begin your internal discussions, . . . in order to ensure that your 
action(s) does not adversely affect the public health.201 
III 
THE NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH 
A. Current Administrative and Legislative Solutions to the Drug 
Shortage Crisis 
This Section examines current legislative, regulatory, and private 
sector approaches to mitigate and prevent drug shortages. These 
efforts will ameliorate some of the effects of drug shortages. As the 
analysis shows, however, in several critical areas, these approaches 
are insufficient. 
1. Executive Order 13588–Reducing Prescription Drug Shortages 
On October 31, 2011, President Obama issued an Executive Order 
in response to the rising number of drug shortages and its impact on 
healthcare in the United States.202 The order directs the FDA to take 
steps to prevent future disruptions in the supply of lifesaving 
medicines.203 An important element in that process is “ensuring that 
the FDA and the public receive adequate advance notice of shortages 
whenever possible.”204 To that end, the order tasks the FDA with a 
two-part directive. The first part instructs the Agency to require drug 
manufacturers to provide advance notice of production interruptions 
 
200 See id. at 20 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 63, at 
13). 
201 COGR 2012 REPORT, supra note 158, at 19. 
202 See Exec. Order No. 13,588, 3 C.F.R. 13588 (2011). 
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
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that could lead to shortages of certain drugs.205 The second part 
requires the FDA to expand and expedite its regulatory reviews of 
new drug suppliers and manufacturing facilities.206 
2. Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act 
(FDASIA) 
a. Expanded Notification Requirements 
In July 2012, President Obama signed the Food and Drug 
Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA) into law.207 The 
Act amends existing Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act (FD&C) drug 
shortage notification requirements and adds new notice provisions.208 
Title X of the Act: (1) expands drug supply disruption and reporting 
requirements, (2) directs the FDA to take specific actions to prevent 
or mitigate shortages, (3) creates a mechanism for tracking drug 
shortage data and sharing that information with key stakeholders, and 
(4) establishes a task force to analyze the causes of drug shortages and 
devise strategic plans that address the shortages.209 
The FDASIA substantially revises the scope of drug shortage 
reporting requirements. The Act’s notice requirements now apply to 
all manufacturers of medically important, approved and unapproved 
drugs.210 Previously, only sole manufacturers of approved drugs were 
required to alert the FDA of a drug shortage.211 Title X also expands 
the scope of drugs subject to shortage notification to include drugs 
used during emergency medical care or surgery.212 Prior FD&C 
notice provisions applied only to drugs that were life-supporting, life-
sustaining, or intended for use in the prevention of a debilitating 
disease or condition.213 
 
205 Id. 
206 Id. In response to the Executive Order’s instruction to address the growing number 
of drug shortages, the FDA published an interim final rule (IFR) that required sole 
manufacturers of certain drugs to provide FDA with six months’ notice before 
discontinuing production. Because IFR is superseded by the Food Drug Administration 
Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA), this Article does not substantively address the IFR. 
207 President Obama Signs the FDA Safety and Innovation Act, NVCA TODAY (July 
27, 2012, 3:29 PM), http://nvcatoday.nvca.org/index.php/life-sciences-policy-updates 
/president-obama-signs-the-fda-safety-and-innovation-act.html. 
208 FDASIA, Pub. L. No. 112–144, § 1001(a), 126 Stat. 993, 1099 (2012). 
209 Id. §§ 1001–08, 126 Stat. at 1099–1108. 
210 Id. § 1001(a)–(c), 126 Stat. at 1099. 
211 Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics Act § 506C(a)–(b), 21 U.S.C. § 356c(a)–(b) (2006). 
212 FDASIA § 1001(a)–(c), 126 Stat. at 1099; 21 U.S.C. § 356c(a)–(b). 
213 21 U.S.C. § 356c(a)–(b). 
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The Act requires all manufacturers to alert the FDA of a permanent 
discontinuance or a production interruption that is likely to lead to a 
meaningful disruption in the availability of that drug in the United 
States.214 Manufacturers must also include in the notice the reasons 
for the disruption.215 Historically, manufacturers alerted the Agency 
only of permanent drug discontinuances. Manufacturers are now 
required to give the FDA six months’ notice before permanently 
discontinuing a drug.216 The FDASIA extends this requirement to 
product interruptions that could lead to a meaningful disruption in the 
supply of the drug within the United States.217 The Act defines 
meaningful disruption as a more than negligible change in production 
that affects the manufacturer’s ability “to fill orders or meet expected 
demand.”218 
The FDASIA requires the FDA to issue letters of noncompliance to 
manufacturers who fail to notify the Agency of a product 
discontinuance or interruption within a specified time frame.219 The 
Act also authorizes the FDA to investigate, and make available, 
instances of noncompliance.220 
In addition to increasing manufacturer notification requirements, 
the FDASIA also expands the Agency’s notification responsibilities 
to the public. The FDA is required to create a process for entities to 
communicate information regarding shortages to the Agency.221 The 
FDA is also responsible for maintaining a publicly available list of 
drugs currently in shortage.222 Finally, in terms of expanding FDA 
reporting requirements, the Act formalizes existing Agency practices 
aimed at preventing shortages. It is now mandatory for the FDA to 
consider the potential impact a warning letter may have on the supply 
of a drug before taking enforcement action.223 An appropriate FDA 
center must vet any Agency enforcement action that could have an 
adverse impact on a drug’s supply center.224 
 
214 FDASIA § 1001(a)(2), 126 Stat. at 1099. 
215 Id. 
216 21 U.S.C. § 356c(a)(3). 
217 FDASIA § 1001(b), 126 Stat. at 1099. 
218 Id. § 1001(h)(3)(A), 126 Stat. at 1101. 
219 Id. § 1001(f), 126 Stat. at 1100. 
220 Id. § 1001(g), 126 Stat. at 1100. 
221 Id. § 1003(a)(1)(B)(iii), (d), 126 Stat. at 1103–04. 
222 Id. § 1004(c), 126 Stat. at 1105. 
223 Id. § 1003(b), 126 Stat. at 1104. 
224 Id. § 1003(a)(1)(D), 126 Stat. at 1103–04. 
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b. Strategic Plan 
Perhaps in tacit recognition that the FDASIA may be insufficient to 
prevent future shortages, the Act creates two mechanisms for 
continuing drug shortage research and strategic planning. First, as 
mentioned above, the Act requires that the Agency establish a task 
force to develop and implement a strategic plan to prevent and 
mitigate shortages.225 Part of the strategic plan must analyze whether 
a Qualified Manufacturing Partner Program is necessary.226 
Manufacturers in the program would have the ability and “capacity to 
quickly supply drugs in, or anticipated to be in, shortage.”227 Under 
the program, the FDA is also tasked with determining if incentives 
would help encourage manufacturers to participate.228 The second 
mechanism the FDASIA creates to continue drug shortage research is 
its requirement for the Comptroller General to examine the causes of 
drug shortages.229 The Comptroller General must submit 
recommendations to Congress regarding how to prevent or alleviate 
shortages by January 9, 2014.230 
B. Current Regulatory Solutions to the Drug Shortage Crisis 
1. FDA Proposed Rule Implementing FDASIA 
The proposed rule would amend FDA regulations to implement the 
FDASIA drug shortage notice provisions. It contains broad 
definitions of several key terms which give maximum effect to the 
FDASIA notice requirements. For example, the proposed rule refers 
to a product as “a specific strength, dosage form, or route of 
administration.”231 Under this rule, if a manufacturer experiences 
disruption that relates to only one strength of a particular drug, it 
would have to notify the FDA, even if other strengths are available.232 
The FDASIA already requires manufacturers to alert the Agency of 
manufacturing interruptions that are likely to lead to a “meaningful 
 
225 Id. § 1003(a), 126 Stat. at 1103–04. 
226 Id. § 1003(a)(1)(B)(v), 126 Stat. at 1103. 
227 Id. § 1003(a)(1)(C)(i)(I), 126 Stat. at 1103. 
228 Id. § 1003(a)(1)(C)(ii), 126 Stat. at 1103. 
229 Id. § 1008, 126 Stat. at 1107–08. 
230 Id. § 1008(d), 126 Stat. at 1008. As of the writing of this Article, the Comptroller 
Report was not available. 
231 Discontinuance or Interruption, supra note 17, at 65,912. 
232 Id. 
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disruption in the supply of that drug in the United States.”233 The 
proposed rule would require manufacturers to report interruptions that 
will likely lead to a meaningful disruption in their own supply.234 In 
other words, it requires manufacturers to notify the FDA even if the 
manufacturer has such a small market share that its disruption is 
unlikely to affect the market as a whole.235 
Consistent with the FDASIA’s intent, these notification 
requirements expand the FDA’s access to information regarding drug 
discontinuances and interruptions. According to the FDA, this 
information will allow the Agency time to work with manufacturers 
to resolve production disruptions or find alternative producers.236 It is 
unclear whether the Agency has the capacity to analyze and react to 
the volume of notifications the proposed rule will likely generate. The 
Agency acknowledges that six months’ advanced notice of a 
manufacturing interruption is purely aspirational.237 The proposed 
rule notes that often only a few days advance notice is practicable.238 
Further, the FDA acknowledges that, in some cases, notice may even 
postdate the production disruption.239 In the proposed rule, the FDA 
expresses concern regarding the expanded definition of the types of 
drugs subject to notice requirements.240 Perhaps mindful of its limited 
resources, the FDA seeks public comment on whether the definitions 
may have the effect of “unintentionally broaden[ing] the scope of 
reporting to such an extent that the Agency is ‘over-notified’ . . . .”241 
Interestingly, the FDA’s ability to enforce the notice requirements 
is limited to issuing public noncompliance letters.242 Generally, the 
FDA’s ability to publicize violations is one of its most powerful 
enforcement tools. In the past, the Agency has used this “name and 
shame” approach and published noncompliance letters of companies 
who failed to conduct federally required parenteral studies.243 
 
233 FDASIA § 1001(a)(2), 126 Stat. at 1099. 
234 Discontinuance or Interruption, supra note 17, at 65,912. 
235 Id. 
236 FDA Announces Actions to Combat Drug Shortages, JAVMA NEWS (Dec. 4, 2013), 
https://www.avma.org/News/JAVMANews/Pages/131215i.aspx. 
237 Discontinuance or Interruption, supra note 17, at 65,914. 
238 See id. 
239 Id. 
240 Id. 
241 Id. 
242 See id. 
243 Alexander Gaffney, Focusing on Pediatric Study Commitments, FDA Prepares to 
Name and Shame Noncompliant Companies, REG. AFF. PROF. SOC’Y (Aug. 26, 2013), 
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Stronger enforcement provisions were included in draft legislation.  
Both the House of Representatives and Senate drug shortage bills 
contained fines for noncompliance.244 The House of Representative 
bill authorized the FDA to levy fines up to $10,000 a day.245 No such 
provisions were included in the FDASIA. Perhaps they were omitted 
because fines or other punitive measures have the potential to 
exacerbate shortages. There would always be the risk that a 
manufacturer subject to a large fine could decide to simply shut down 
a facility rather than remediate it. 
2. FDA Drug Shortage Task Force 
As mentioned above, one of the ways the FDASIA tries to mitigate 
and prevent drug shortages is by requiring the FDA to create a task 
force to develop a Strategic Plan.246 Released in October of 2013, the 
Strategic Plan outlines ways to improve the FDA’s response to 
manufacturer shortage notifications.247 Task Force recommendations 
include: (1) streamlining FDA internal processes, (2) clarifying roles 
and responsibilities of manufacturers, (3) improving communications 
with the public and healthcare providers regarding actual or potential 
shortages, and (4) collaborating with manufacturers on remediation 
efforts.248 
The FDA identifies deficiencies in product and manufacturing 
facilities as the leading causes of drug shortages.249 The Strategic 
Plan includes a blueprint of Agency actions to strengthen its effort to 
address shortages. As part of the plan, the FDA will create an Office 
of Pharmaceutical Quality.250 The Agency will develop a risk-based 
approached to detect manufacturing problems that could result in 
shortages.251 According to the plan, the FDA will also increase 
collaborations with industry and other stakeholders.252 With this joint 
 
http://www.raps.org/focus-online/news/news-article-view/article/3989/focusing-on            
-pediatric-study-commitments-fda-prepares-to-name-and-shame-noncompl.aspx. 
244 Preserving Access to Life-Saving Medications Act of 2011, H.R. 2245, 112th Cong. 
§ 506C(b)(7) (2011); S. 296, 112th Cong. § 2(a)(6) (2011). 
245 Preserving Access to Life-Saving Medications Act of 2011, H.R. 2245, 112th Cong. 
§ 506C(b)(7) (2011). 
246 FDASIA, Pub. L. No. 112–144, § 1003, 126 Stat. 993, 1103 (2012). 
247 FDA 2013 PLAN, supra note 14, at 3. 
248 Id. at 18–19. 
249 Id. at 11. 
250 Id. at 20. 
251 Id. at 21. 
252 Id. 
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effort, the task force believes the FDA can gain a better understanding 
of shortages and strategies to prevent them.253 
Notwithstanding these measures, the Strategic Plan notes that 
“shortages cannot be resolved until one or more manufacturers 
commit to fill in for lost production.”254 The Strategic Plan 
recommends manufacturers consider building redundant 
manufacturing capacity or increasing inventory levels to lower the 
risks of shortages.255 The task force notes that the FDA lacks the 
authority to require or regulate such practices, but it recognizes that 
the Agency is exploring ways to develop positive incentives to 
improve prioritizing manufacturing quality.256 
The Strategic Plan seems to represent a nascent proposal rather 
than a fully developed approach to mitigating and preventing 
shortages. Two years ago, the FDASIA directed the FDA to create a 
plan to improve intra-agency and interagency communication.257 The 
Strategic Plan indicates that the FDA is still “implementing” such a 
proposed office in the Office of Pharmaceutical Quality, but the 
Agency expects it to begin in January 2015.258 The FDA was also 
instructed to explore whether a qualified manufacturing partner 
program would help mitigate future drug shortages.259 In response to 
the FDA’s request for public comments, the Agency received 
substantial industry input specifically addressing the viability of such 
a partner program.260 In addition, the Agency had access to a 
potential model in the Biomedical Advanced Research and 
Development Authority (BARDA) program, the partnership and data 
used to mitigate Doxil shortages.261 Nevertheless, the task force states 
 
253 Id. at 23–24. 
254 Id. at 38. 
255 Id. at 6. 
256 Id. at 22–23. 
257 FDASIA, Pub. L. No. 112–144, § 1003(a)(1)(B)(i), 126 Stat. 993, 1103 (2012). 
258 FDA 2013 PLAN, supra note 14, at 20. The Office of Pharmaceutical Quality 
“creates a single unit dedicated to product quality . . . [and] is expected to provide better 
alignment among all drug functions . . . including review, inspection, and research.” Office 
of Pharmaceutical Quality, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/Officeof 
MedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ucm418347.htm (last updated Oct. 16, 2014). 
259 FDASIA § 1003(a)(1)(B)(v). 
260 See Food and Drug Administration Drug Shortages Task Force and Strategic Plan; 
Request for Comments, FED. REG. (Feb. 7, 2013), https://www.federalregister.gov/articles 
/2013/02/12/2013-03198/food-and-drug-administration-drug-shortages-task-force-and       
-strategic-plan-request-for-comments [hereinafter Request for Comments] (noting that the 
FDA received 127 comments). 
261 Id. 
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that it still needs more industry input on feasibility.262 As a result, the 
Strategic Plan contains no information regarding whether it will 
actually create such a partnership program. 
In crafting the Strategic Plan, the FDA also requested public 
comment regarding how manufacturers use quality metrics to monitor 
production and select contract manufacturers.263 In response, 
manufacturers and trade associations submitted comments describing 
several different industry standards and quality assurance 
approaches.264 This input provided the task force a range of reporting 
material that purchasers and manufacturers identified as helpful in 
assessing quality. However, the task force does not appear to consider 
these or any other system to standardize and consolidate quality 
reporting information. Rather, the Strategic Plan indicates that 
purchasers should rely on already published data.265 The FDA 
eschews its responsibility to create useful quality metrics by stating 
“buyers ultimately decide how or whether they will use this data 
when they make purchasing decisions.”266 The Strategic Plan makes 
no reference to increasing the availability of quality information to the 
public or presenting the already available information in a more 
usable format for purchasers. 
The Strategic Plan does make passing reference to shortage-related 
issues it considers outside of the FDA’s direct control. On the issue of 
manufacturing incentives, the Strategic Plan indicates that the FDA’s 
“ability to offer financial or other economic means to promote 
innovation in quality manufacturing is limited.”267 This inert 
statement misses the point. No one expects the Agency to mete out 
cash rewards for quality improvements. As evident in several industry 
responses, the FDA has the ability to offer several valuable 
noneconomic incentives. For example, the Agency could offer 
expedited “review of new facilities for companies that have exhibited 
exemplary manufacturing quality standards . . . .”268 The Agency 
could expedite product reviews for manufacturers who voluntarily 
 
262 FDA 2013 PLAN, supra note 14, at 5. 
263 Request for Comments, supra note 260. 
264 Id. 
265 FDA 2013 PLAN, supra note 14, at 22. 
266 Id. 
267 Id. 
268 Jennifer M. Thomas, FDA Issues Proposed Rule and Strategic Plan to Address 
Drug Shortages, FDA LAW BLOG (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law 
_blog_hyman_phelps/2013/11/fda-issues-proposed-rule-and-strategic-plan-to-address        
-drug-shortages.html. 
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invest in state of the art production technologies. Yet, the Strategic 
Plan does not analyze, or include, any quality-based incentives. 
Despite some shortcomings, the Strategic Plan could have a 
positive effect on mitigating shortages. As enacted, however, it is 
questionable whether the task force will have sufficient time to 
entrench itself within the market and regulatory system sufficiently to 
have any lasting effect. Pursuant to FD&C section 506D(f), the 
structure and purpose of the task force ends in 2017.269 This sunset 
provision means that even if the Strategic Plan’s initiatives begin to 
succeed, the task force will cease operations at the end of five 
years.270 Given the severity of the drug shortages, however, such a 
short time frame does not give the task force much time to assert itself 
before losing its mandate. 
C. Current Industry Solution to the Drug Shortage Crisis 
The Generic Pharmaceutical Association (GPhA) and a subset of 
member companies have collaborated with the FDA to develop and 
implement a program to address potential drug shortages.271 Under 
the Accelerated Recovery Initiative (ARI), generic companies share 
manufacturing information about drugs in short supply with the FDA 
and a third party.272 
The ARI consists of voluntary confidential communications among 
the FDA, IMS Health, and stakeholders involved in the 
manufacturing and distribution of generic drugs currently in 
shortage.273 The goal of the initiative is to use real-time supply and 
 
269 See Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics Act § 506D(f), 21 U.S.C. § 356d(f) (2012), 
amended by FDASIA, Pub. L. No. 112–144, § 1003(f), 126 Stat. 993, 1104 (2012). 
270 Id. 
271 GPhA Receives Positive FTC Advisory Opinion on the Accelerated Recovery 
Initiative, GENERIC PHARMACEUTICAL ASS’N, http://www.gphaonline.org/gpha-media 
/press/gpha-receives-positive-ftc-advisory-opinion-on-the-accelerated-recovery-initiative 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2014) [hereinafter FTC Advisory Opinion]. 
272 Thomas Sullivan, FTC Approves Accelerated Recovery Initiative to Reduce Drug 
Shortages, POL’Y & MED. (Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.policymed.com/2012/09/ftc             
-approves-accelerated-recovery-initiative-to-reduce-drug-shortages.html [hereinafter FTC 
Approves Accelerated Recovery Initiative]. 
273 Id. IMS Health is an information and technology company that collects, analyzes, 
and connects healthcare data on diseases, treatments, results, and costs to enable its clients 
to operate more efficiently. About IMS Health, IMS HEALTH, http://www.imshealth.com 
/portal/site/imshealth/menuitem.051a1939316f851e170417041ad8c22a/?vgnextoid=7311e
590cb4dc310VgnVCM100000a48d2ca2RCRD&vgnextfmt=default (last visited Oct. 28, 
2014). IMS Health is the independent third party ARI uses to collect and impart data from 
the stakeholders to the FDA. FTC Approves Accelerated Recovery Initiative, supra note 
272. 
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distribution information to expedite Agency efforts to mitigate 
shortages.274 The multi-stakeholder approach also will use 
manufacturers’ production and release forecasts to assist Agency staff 
in preventing shortages.275 The FDA and GPhA are also currently 
working to identify four to eight generic sterile injectables that have 
at least two manufacturers to cooperate in meeting market production 
needs.276 
A key element of the ARI is the agreement among drug 
manufacturers to pool competitively sensitive production information 
about shortage drugs. To avoid antitrust concerns, the GPhA 
requested review by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).277 The 
FTC concluded that safeguards built into the process are sufficient to 
prevent collusion and unfair competition among the participants.278 
For example, the ARI requires that an independent third party gather 
and transmit the data from the stakeholders to the FDA.279 “[N]o 
other party . . . will have access to this information or any analysis 
derived therefrom.”280 The initiative also requires ARI participants to 
sign a binding commitment not to use the program for anticompetitive 
ends.281 
D. Things Left Unsaid: Additional Deficiencies in the Current 
Approach 
The measures discussed above attempt to mitigate drug shortages 
through advanced agency notification, increased industry 
communication regarding drug supply levels, and task force efforts 
aimed at increasing manufacturing quality. These are positive steps; 
however, they focus on the symptoms, rather than the causes, of drug 
shortages. The underlying cause for generic manufacturers’ decision 
to stop producing certain categories of drugs lies in simple 
economics. Advanced notification requirements or increased industry 
communications will not replenish drugs in situations in which slim 
 
274 FTC Approves Accelerated Recovery Initiative, supra note 272. 
275 Id. 
276 Id. 
277 FTC Staff Issues Advisory Opinion Regarding Generic Pharmaceutical 
Association’s Proposed Initiative to Address Drug Shortages, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Aug. 
8, 2012), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/08/ftc-staff-issues-advisory   
-opinion-regarding-generic. 
278 Id. 
279 FTC Approves Accelerated Recovery Initiative, supra note 272. 
280 Id. 
281 Id. 
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profits and market imbalances have resulted in manufacturers leaving 
the market. Until there is increased elasticity of demand or supply, 
shortages will continue. Yet, the solutions implemented thus far fail to 
acknowledge this fact. 
Admittedly, the FDA’s ability to end shortages is constrained. The 
Agency does not have the legal authority to compel manufacturers to 
produce drugs.282 Nor does the FDA possess the manufacturing 
ability to produce drugs itself. The FDASIA, the proposed rule, and 
the Strategic Plan fail to address the imbalance of market forces in the 
current system. To date, no legislation has been passed that offers a 
solution to the root causes of manufacturers’ inability or 
unwillingness to meet current drug demands. What follows is a 
multiparty approach that addresses the economic underpinnings of 
drug shortages. The next Part offers legislative, regulatory, and 
private industry solutions aimed at motivating generic manufacturers 
to produce safe, adequate quantities of affordable generics that are 
currently in short supply. 
IV 
MULTIPRONGED APPROACH TO END DRUG SHORTAGES 
A. Regulatory Solutions 
1. Manufacturer Incentives 
It is difficult to conceive of a viable approach to ending shortages 
without manufacturer incentives. The task force acknowledges that 
incentives are a key element in its prevention strategies.283 However, 
the Strategic Plan contains no Agency-specific proposals.284 Instead, 
the drafters encourage unnamed “others” to explore means to 
incentivize manufacturing innovation and quality.285 Setting aside the 
Agency’s self-imposed limitations, there are several incentives the 
FDA could offer that would have an economic impact on 
manufacturers’ willingness to both remain in and enter the market to 
produce critical, lifesaving drugs. 
The Agency could offer targeted financial incentives in exchange 
for generic manufacturers building extra capacity into their facilities. 
Infrastructure redundancy measures might include manufacturers 
 
282 FDA 2013 PLAN, supra note 14, at 23. 
283 See id. at 22. 
284 See generally id. 
285 Id. at 22. 
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establishing and maintaining alternate production lines or facilities.286  
Manufacturers who create risk-management programs that include 
extra manufacturing capacity dedicated to prevent shortages could be 
eligible for tax rebates.287 In return for increased manufacturing 
capacity, the FDA could additionally waive user fee requirements and 
streamline the approval process for redundant facilities at single-
source manufacturers.288 The Agency could also offer tax rebates 
offered for programs that identify and maintain alternate active 
pharmaceutical ingredient (API) suppliers. 
Improving quality in the manufacturing process is another core 
element in preventing shortages. Currently, the drug’s price is the 
primary consideration in purchasing decisions.289 This can lead 
manufacturers to prioritize reducing costs over quality. This type of 
manufacturing approach can contribute to shortages. Agency 
incentives that encourage better manufacturing processes could help 
reorient the industry. Agency actions could include reduced oversight 
for manufacturers who maintain good compliance histories and 
effective risk remediation plans.290 Reduced oversight could include 
downgrading filing categories for site transfers and assay 
improvements.291 The FDA could consider granting additional 
exclusivity for products in the same therapeutic areas as the drugs in 
shortage to manufacturers who consistently maintain high-quality 
manufacturing standards.292 
The FDA could also consider implementing a scoring system to 
encourage manufacturers to focus on quality. The FDA could post on 
its website the names of manufacturing facilities who received high-
 
286 See Letter from Richard Johnson, President, Parenteral Drug Ass’n, to Div. of 
Docket Mgmt., FDA 4 (Mar. 13, 2013) [hereinafter Letter from Richard Johnson], 
available at http://www.pda.org/docs/default-source/website-document-library/scientific   
-and-regulatory-affairs/regulatory-comments-resources/2013/fdas-draft-drug-shortages      
-strategic-plan-march-13-2013.pdf?sfvrsn=6. 
287 Id. at 5. 
288 See id. at 4; see also Letter from Cancer Leadership Council, to Leslie Kux, 
Assistant Comm’r for Policy, FDA (Mar. 14, 2013), available at http://www.lymphoma 
.org/atf/cf/%7Baaf3b4e5-2c43-404c-afe5-fd903c87b254%7D/LEADERSHIP_COUNCIL 
_DRUGSHORTAGE_STRATEGICPLAN.PDF. 
289 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 63, at 5; see, e.g., Letter 
from Blair Childs, Senior Vice President, Pub. Affairs, Premier, to Margaret Hamburg, 
Comm’r, Food & Drug Admin. (Mar. 14, 2013) [hereinafter Premier Letter], available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2013-N-0124-0129. 
290 Premier Letter, supra note 289, at 4. 
291 Letter from Richard Johnson, supra note 286, at 4. 
292 See Premier Letter, supra note 289, at 4. 
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quality scores during Agency inspections. This FDA “stamp of 
approval” could favorably influence the supplier selection. It could 
also improve the market value of these publicly held companies. 
Another approach would offer incentives to manufacturers who 
successfully adopt the Pharmaceutical Quality Manufacturing 
Guidelines contained in the International Conference on 
Harmonization (ICH).293 The ICH provisions cover risk-management 
as well as maintaining quality in the pharmaceutical sector.294 The 
Agency could also award these manufacturers with the FDA “stamp 
of approval.” In addition, the existing Good Manufacturing Practice 
regulations provide a framework for manufacturers to produce safe, 
pure, and high quality drugs.295 
Finally, the FDA could consider financial incentives patterned after 
the Orphan Drug Act. Under that Act, the Agency offers tax credits 
for clinical research and a seven-year period of exclusive marketing to 
developers of drugs for rare diseases.296 Since the Act’s passage in 
1983, the FDA has approved more than 1000 orphan products for rare 
diseases.297 Prior to this incentive-based Act, only a handful of 
orphan drugs were on the market.298 As noted by Abbey Meyers, 
then-president of the National Organization for Rare Disorders, “[t]he 
act has been very successful in attracting companies.”299 A similar 
tax-based incentive could help attract new entrants to the market by 
countering the low profit margins manufacturers associate with 
producing certain critical drugs. 
2. Improved FDA Communication 
A primary goal of the FDASIA is averting drug shortages through 
improved communication and notification.300 A critical component to 
 
293 FDA, PHARMACEUTICAL CGMPS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY–A RISK-BASED 
APPROACH 9 (2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Development 
ApprovalProcess/Manufacturing/QuestionsandAnswersonCurrentGoodManufacturing 
PracticescGMPforDrugs/UCM176374.pdf. 
294 Id. at 14. 
295 See generally CURRENT GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICES, supra note 68. 
296 Orphan Drug Act, 21 C.F.R. § 316 (2014); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., ORPHAN 
DRUG ACT: IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT 1 (2001) [hereinafter ORPHAN DRUG ACT 
IMPACT], available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-09-00-00380.pdf. 
297 ORPHAN DRUG ACT IMPACT, supra note 296, at 1. 
298 Tamar Nordenberg, Inside FDA: When a Drug Is in Short Supply, DRUGS.COM (Oct. 
2004), http://www.drugs.com/news/inside-fda-short-supply-3530.html. 
299 Id. 
300 See FDASIA, § 1003(a)(1)(B)(iii), (d), 126 Stat. 993, 1103–04 (2012). 
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achieving that goal is the Agency’s ability to quickly disseminate 
information. The FDA should maintain a real-time map that allows 
healthcare providers to see where critical drugs can be found and in 
what quantities.301 The FDA’s website should include timelines 
regarding how long the Agency expects a shortage to last.302 The 
expected duration of the shortage would help manufacturers provide 
guidance to hospitals regarding appropriate steps to take to minimize 
the impact of the shortage.303 The FDA website should also post the 
compliance status of manufacturing sites and products.304 
The FDA maintains an index of all drug shortages.305 This system 
relies on manufacturer-supplied information regarding current drug 
supply levels.306 While helpful in providing the public information 
regarding drug availability, the system could be improved. The 
Agency should consider creating a template for manufacturers to 
submit drug index information.307 A streamlined approach would 
increase efficiency and ensure that the information is submitted in a 
uniform format by the reporting manufacturers.308 
There reportedly have been more than 2000 generic applications in 
the queue for FDA approval.309 The median wait-time is thirty 
months.310 It is critical that the FDA devote the necessary resources 
to expedite approvals and eliminate this backlog. Shorter approval 
times allow more lifesaving medications into the market. Reducing 
the thirty-month approval timeframe would also give the Agency 
more generic options within the six-month manufacturer notice period 
of an anticipated drug shortage.311 Increasing the number of FDA-
 
301 Letter from Thomas K. McInerny, President, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, to Margaret 
Hamburg, Comm’r, FDA (Mar. 13, 2013), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#! 
documentDetail;D=FDA-2013-N-0124-0125. 
302 See Premier Letter, supra note 289, at 5. 
303 Id. 
304 Letter from Richard Johnson, supra note 286, at 3. 
305 Current and Resolved Drug Shortages, supra note 23. 
306 See id. 
307 Letter from David R. Gaugh, Senior Vice President for Sci. & Regulatory Affairs, 
Generic Pharmaceutical Ass’n, to Div. of Dockets Mgmt., Food & Drug Admin. (Mar. 14, 
2013), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2013-N-0124   
-0087. 
308 Id. 
309 Link, Hagerty & Kantarjian, supra note 100, at 694. 
310 Id. 
311 Id. 
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approved entrants would also reduce the presence and influence of 
gray market suppliers.312 
3. Quality Metrics 
Opacity in the pharmaceutical drug production process limits 
purchasers’ information about manufacturing quality.313 Purchasers 
often base their knowledge on press reports or personal 
experiences.314 As a result, they may be “unaware of potential 
variation in pharmaceutical product quality and assume products are 
manufactured to high standards.”315 In this environment, price is 
often the sole determinant in deciding which generic drug to 
purchase.316 These facts, and the FDA’s goal of increasing 
manufacturing quality, require the task force to revisit its approach to 
quality metrics. 
The Strategic Plan cannot adequately address production quality 
concerns without including some type of metrics for purchasers. 
Access to quality metrics—such as the number and level of recalls, 
inspection irregularities, and production line maintenance reports—
would help purchasers and prescribers balance price with quality.317 
Manufacturing quality metrics should be as readily available to 
purchasers as price when ordering sterile injectables. Changing the 
purchasing dynamics would encourage manufacturers to focus on 
quality.318 Nursing homes, restaurants, and other settings have 
successfully used this approach when it is difficult to observe or 
interpret quality.319 
As noted previously, quality metrics should also be available to 
manufacturers choosing a contract provider. The FDA solicited and 
received several industry examples regarding useful metrics to 
evaluate contract manufacturers.320 Identified metrics include 
employee turnover rates, inspection history, ability to meet the 
contract giver’s quality system requirements, facility maintenance 
 
312 Id. 
313 Woodcock & Wosinska, supra note 71. 
314 Letter from Richard Johnson, supra note 286, at 2. 
315 Id. 
316 See Woodcock & Wosinska, supra note 71. 
317 Letter from David R. Gaugh, supra note 307. 
318 Id. 
319 Id. 
320 Request for Comments, supra note 260; GAO DRUG SHORTAGES, supra note 22, at 
74–83. 
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reports, and the availability of alternate suppliers.321 These metrics 
have high industry acceptance as reliable ways to assess 
manufacturing quality. 
The Agency also solicited and received comments on metrics the 
industry relies on to assess internal quality. According to comments 
submitted by Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) 
and the GPhA, pharmaceutical companies regularly monitor error 
rates to assess quality.322 “[H]igh error rates are considered evidence 
of poor process control, poor training of operators, lax oversight by 
supervisors, poorly maintained equipment and facilities, or poor 
product and process characterization . . . .”323 Comments submitted 
by the Parenteral Drug Association (PAD) note that yield analysis, 
inspection outcomes, and contingency plans for act-of-God situations, 
such as pandemics, are commonly used quality metrics.324 PAD 
comments also state that companies use similar metrics when 
selecting contract manufacturers.325 
Based on these industry suggestions, the FDA should adopt 
standard nationwide metrics to assess all manufacturing quality. To 
increase transparency, the FDA could then use these metrics to issue 
quarterly trend analyses on how manufacturers have performed.326 
The FDA should also provide manufacturers a clear policy statement 
on what the Agency reviews during facility inspections.327 Finally, 
the FDA should consider revising its Form 483 facility inspection 
report; a more user-friendly format would allow non-manufacturers to 
better assess the level of concern the FDA has regarding a facility.328 
 
321 Letter from Richard Johnson, supra note 286, at 3. 
322 Letter from David R. Gaugh, supra note 307; Letter from Alice E. Till, Vice 
President, Sci. Policy and Tech. Affairs, PhRMA, to Div. of Dockets Mgmt., FDA 2 (Feb. 
12, 2013), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2013-N      
-0124-0106. 
323 Biopharm Int’l, FDA Seeks Metrics to Define Drug Quality, ASQ (Oct. 15, 2013), 
http://asq.org/qualitynews/qnt/execute/displaySetup?newsID=17124. 
324 Letter from Richard Johnson, supra note 286, at 1–2. 
325 Id. at 3. 
326 See id. 
327 Premier Letter, supra note 289, at 3. 
328 Id. A Form 483 “notifies the company’s management of objectionable conditions. 
At the conclusion of an inspection, the FDA Form 483 is presented and discussed with the 
company’s senior management.” FDA Form 483 Frequently Asked Questions, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/Inspections/ucm256377.htm (last updated Mar. 13, 2012). 
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4. International Imports 
The FDA has approved a limited number of imports from Europe 
to help mitigate shortages.329 In 2010, the Agency permitted import 
of the unapproved anesthetics agent Propofol to address shortages.330 
The task force should expand the scope of the Strategic Plan to 
include a mechanism that allows for the timely import of approved 
drugs from foreign markets.331 International imports are referenced in 
the Strategic Plan’s appendix.332 However, foreign markets are an 
underdeveloped aspect of the task force’s approach to mitigate 
shortages. The FDA could also consider adapting the tentative 
approval process the Agency has used to approve anti-HIV 
medications for purchase.333 For more than a decade, the FDA has 
approved foreign drugs as part of the President’s Emergency Plan for 
AIDS Relief.334 This plan allows for “the review and approval of 
high-quality medical products made in foreign countries and . . . 
develop[s] mechanisms to allow the purchase and domestic use of 
products when domestic shortages . . . occur.”335 
B. Congressional Solutions 
1. Hatch-Waxman Act Revisions 
Revising certain Hatch-Waxman Act requirements for generic 
manufacturers may help address the shortage crisis. In general terms, 
the Hatch-Waxman Act established a streamlined approval process 
for generic drugs.336 Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic 
 
329 Questions and Answers on the Propofol Shortage, PROPOFOL SHORTAGE QA, 
http://www.ipqpubs.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/Propofol_Shortage_QA.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2014). 
330 Id. 
331 See id. 
332 FDA 2013 PLAN, supra note 14, at 39. 
333 Press Release, FDA, FDA Gives Tentative Approval to New Generic AIDS Drug in 
Association with the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (May 18, 2006), 
available at http://www.fda.gov/InternationalPrograms/FDABeyondOurBordersForeign 
Offices/AsiaandAfrica/ucm119230.htm. 
334 Id. 
335 Letter from Mark Harrington & Coco Jervis, Treatment Action Grp., FDA to Drug 
Shortages Task Force and Strategic Plan 2 (Mar. 14, 2013), available at http://www 
.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2013-N-0124-0116. 
336 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012); see generally Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG 
L.J. 187 (1999) (describing the drafting, function, and revisions of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act). 
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manufacturers file Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDA) with 
the FDA to receive marketing approval.337 Congress could amend the 
Hatch-Waxman Act’s ANDA process to require manufacturers to 
include current product demand projections and their plans for 
fulfilling those demands.338 Borrowing from the legislative approach 
used for patented drugs, the amendment could also require that 
manufacturers build redundancy into their production facilities.339 
This proposal could diminish the impact of production disruptions on 
overall market supply, but such an amendment would likely face 
legislative opposition. 
The Eleventh Circuit and the D.C. Circuit both recently affirmed 
that the FDA does not have the authority to regulate or control 
manufacturer decisions regarding production.340 In addition, accurate 
production forecasts may be difficult given the limited control 
manufacturers have over the supply of raw materials used in their 
medications.341 Approximately eighty percent of the raw materials 
used in manufacturing drugs are imported.342 Many of these imports 
are from countries where political instability or problems with 
product contamination are common.343 Industry stakeholders would 
similarly oppose legislation that penalizes manufacturers for not 
meeting product goals due to events that were outside their control. 
A slightly different approach would grant the FDA authority to 
revoke market approval if a manufacturer consistently fails to meet 
stated production levels.344 This too would likely face fierce 
opposition. Legislation authorizing the FDA to require manufacturers 
to include redundancy capabilities and revoke market approval of 
drugs in short supply seems to run counter to the FDASIA’s intent. 
 
337 Mossinghoff, supra note 336, at 188, 190. 
338 See Chabner, supra note 121, at 2148; Hoffman, supra note 26, at 16. 
339 Hoffman, supra note 26, at 16. 
340 Lacognata v. Hospira, Inc., 521 F. App’x 866 (11th Cir. June 7, 2013) 
(unpublished), aff’g No. 8:12-cv-822-T-30TGW, 2012 WL 6962884 (M.D. Fla. July 2, 
2012); see also Carik v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 12-272, at *5 (D.D.C. 
Nov. 27, 2013). 
341 See Hospital Drug Shortages, PREMIER (Mar. 2012), https://legacy.premierinc.com 
/about/advocacy/iss/Position%20Papers/Hospital-Drug-Shortages-Premier-Policy-Paper    
-March2012.pdf. 
342 Id. 
343 Id. 
344 Hoffman, supra note 26, at 16. 
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2. Medicare Modernization Act 
Some politicians view the MMA’s reimbursement system as one of 
the primary economic causes of drug shortages.345 In 2012, members 
of Congress introduced the Patient Access to Drugs in Shortage Act, 
which aimed to increase generic injectable production by recalibrating 
the Medicare rate to more accurately reflect the value of those 
drugs.346 The legislation proposed amending the Social Security Act 
to exempt generic sterile injectables with three or fewer active 
manufacturers from the ASP-based reimbursement pricing method.347 
The proposed legislation died in committee.348 However, its approach 
of eliminating disincentives to production posed by the Medicare 
reimbursement system may be a necessary component to any long-
term approach to end drug shortages. To date, no other potential 
solution directly addresses manufacturers’ profit margin concerns. 
An alternate solution is to establish a minimum price for generics 
based on comparable brand-name drugs.349 If a brand-name drug 
costs $70,000 per year, the generic version could be priced at 5% to 
10%, or $3500 to $7000 per year.350 Another suggestion is to 
establish a payment system based on disease-management fees rather 
than drug sales.351 These more robust reimbursement rates could 
provide the economic incentive for generic drug manufacturers to 
enter and remain in the market. 
Enacting such a proposal, however, would be challenging. In fact, 
a past proposal aimed at reducing the deficit recommended the 
opposite. A joint committee considered reducing the Medicare Part B 
drug reimbursement formula from ASP +6% to ASP +3%.352 The 
MMA’s reimbursement system illustrates the classic tension between 
 
345 See Emanuel, supra note 107. 
346 Patient Access to Drugs in Shortage Act of 2012, H.R. 6611, 112th Cong. (2012); 
see The Patient Access to Drugs in Shortage Act, POL’Y & MED. (Dec. 20, 2012), 
http://www.policymed.com/2012/12/the-patient-access-to-drugs-in-shortage-act.html 
[hereinafter Patient Access]. 
347 Patient Access, supra note 346. 
348 H.R. 6611 (112th): Patient Access to Drugs in Shortage Act of 2012, 
GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr6611 (last visited Nov. 8, 
2014). 
349 Link, Hagerty & Kantarjian, supra note 100, at 693–94. 
350 Id. 
351 Hoffman, supra note 26, at 18. 
352 Special Action Alert: Tell Congress to Oppose Medicare Cuts to Cancer-Fighting 
Drugs!, US ONCOLOGY NETWORK (Nov. 10, 2011), https://ex.democracydata.com 
/CB13278093BDCEAE05CA9FC1F62FC3D4C5EC6424/799bd1ed-e4e6-4ae3-a48f-ef54 
9b94c160.pdf. 
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a public program’s goal of cost containment and manufacturers’ need 
to maintain profit margins sufficient to justify continued 
production.353 
3. GPOs and Safe Harbor Provisions 
Over the past two decades, GPOs’ effect on competition and 
innovation has been the subject of inquiry. As previously discussed, 
some have theorized that GPO anticompetitive business practices are 
a major contributor to current shortages.354 Numerous Senate 
Antitrust Subcommittee hearings and GAO investigations have 
scrutinized the GPO contract practices.355 In 2005, members of 
Congress introduced a draft discussion bill to eliminate GPO contract 
administration fees by repealing the Medicare anti-kickback safe 
harbor provisions.356 Supporters of the bill argued that GPO 
administrative fees create a “pay to play” mechanism that inhibits free 
market competition.357 The bill died in subcommittee.358 Two years 
ago, Congress asked the GAO to investigate GPO business 
practices.359 Specifically, lawmakers were concerned that GPO 
contract provisions limit competition among manufacturers and 
contribute to drug shortages.360 It appears, however, that the GAO has 
taken no action on this request. 
GPOs’ role in the healthcare supply system remains controversial. 
To assess accurately whether substantive changes should be made to 
 
353 Hoffman, supra note 26, at 18. 
354 Blair & Durrance, supra note 154. 
355 See generally Letter from Herb Kohl, Charles E. Grassley & Tom Coburn, Senators, 
to the Gov’t Accountability Office (Mar. 30, 2012) [hereinafter Kohl, Grassley & Coburn 
Letter], available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/589778.pdf; GROUP PURCHASING 
ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 150; Group Purchasing Organizations: Services Provided to 
Customers and Initiatives Regarding Their Business Practices, GAO (Aug. 2010), 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-738. 
356 Patricia Earl & Phillip L. Zweig, Connecting the Dots: How Anticompetitive 
Contracting Practices, Kickbacks, and Self-Dealing by Hospital Group Purchasing 
Organizations (GPOs) Caused the U.S. Drug Shortage, CARE & COST (Feb. 14, 2012), 
http://careandcost.com/2012/02/14/connecting-the-dots-how-anticompetitive-contracting   
-practices-kickbacks-and-self-dealing-by-hospital-group-purchasing-organizations-gpos    
-caused-the-u-s-drug-shortage/. 
357 See id. 
358 Id. 
359 Press Release, Markey, Top Democrats Call for GAO Investigation into Link 
Between Drug Shortages and Increased Reliance on Compounding Pharmacies (Nov. 15, 
2012), available at http://www.psanes.org/Portals/0/docs/Drug%20Shortages/Markey%20 
Press%20Release%2011-15-2012.pdf. 
360 Id. 
LEE (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/2015  8:20 AM 
2014] The Drug Shortage Crisis: When Generic Manufacturers “Just Say No” 399 
safe harbor provisions to ensure competition and innovation among 
generic manufacturers, more information is needed. One approach is 
to use various governmental agency tools to compel the necessary 
information. The Executive Branch could direct the Department of 
Justice and the FTC to investigate GPO business practices.361  These 
agencies can subpoena documents, compel testimony, and seize 
property. Additionally, they have the authority to prosecute if they 
find anticompetition violations. 
In 2004, Congress asked the GAO to investigate the impact of 
GPO administrative fees on generic manufacturers’ ability to upgrade 
their facilities and conduct quality control.362 A 2012 GAO report 
notes the DHHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) has the authority 
to compel production of this information.363 For more than ten years, 
the OIG has failed to regularly obtain the information.364 The FDA 
should prevail upon the DHHS to demand that GPOs immediately 
produce the data and to continue to do so on a consistent basis. The 
DHHS should also make the information available to the public on 
the OIG website. 
The FTC could also exercise its antitrust enforcement authority to 
investigate GPO antitrust allegations. Shortly after the Executive 
Order directing the FDA to end drug shortages, five U.S. senators also 
made a request to FTC Chairman Jonathan Leibowitz to examine the 
healthcare delivery system’s effect on patients’ access to drugs.365 
The FTC has not made any public statement regarding the 
investigation. The Executive Branch could consider directing the FTC 
to make its findings public. To the extent appropriate, the FTC should 
also exercise its authority to “halt anticompetitive contracting 
practices” that are involved in GPO business practices.366 
C. Industry Solutions 
Ending drug shortages requires a multiparty approach. Congress 
and the FDA play significant roles in addressing shortages. Their 
 
361 Kohl, Grassley & Coburn Letter, supra note 355, at 3 n.8. 
362 See id. at 3. 
363 Id. at 3, 7. 
364 See id. at 3, 8. 
365 Exec. Order No. 13,588, 3 C.F.R. 281 (2011); Letter from Barbara Boxer, Charles 
E. Grassley, Richard J. Durbin, Herb Kohl & Tom Harkin, Senators, to Jonathan 
Leibowitz, Chairman, FTC (Nov. 9, 2011), available at http://www.puncturemovie.com 
/wp-content /themes/Romix/pdfs/herb-kohl-11-9-11.pdf. 
366 Earl & Zweig, supra note 356. 
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efforts will fail, however, unless generic manufacturers agree to 
increase drug production. The Strategic Plan highlights the Agency’s 
need to collaborate with manufacturers to develop new strategies as a 
key feature to address shortages. 
One potential solution involves manufacturers collaborating with 
the FDA to establish voluntary production and quality levels in 
exchange for customized incentive packages. The FDA cannot 
compel manufacturers to meet certain capacity levels,367 nor can the 
Agency prevent a manufacturer from exiting the market to pursue 
other more profitable production lines. However, in return for 
facilities building in extra capacity to meet pre-set production levels, 
the FDA can provide a variety of economic and noneconomic 
incentives that manufacturers could select to suit their individual 
business needs.368 
This approach is appealing because, unlike other solutions, it offers 
a flexible approach for manufacturers to create their own incentives. 
Generic manufacturers have different priorities depending on whether 
they are considering entering the market or whether they are already 
producing a drug in shortage. As a result, some incentives will be 
more attractive than others based on manufacturers’ individual 
business plans and strategies. Manufacturers in the final stages of 
drug development may value a voucher for expedited FDA product 
review over a tax rebate. 
In exchange for a customized incentive package, manufacturers 
would commit to increasing capacity while maintaining quality. 
While the FDA could offer this option on an individual manufacturer 
basis, an industry-wide approach is preferable. As discussed 
previously, one manufacturer building redundancy into its operations 
results in higher production costs compared to others in the market.369 
To avoid that production cost differential, all manufacturers would 
need to commit to infrastructure improvements sufficient to meet the 
established capacity levels. In addition to ending shortages, this 
approach eliminates the downstream effects of gray market suppliers 
and price gouging. 
 
367 See supra text accompanying note 282. 
368 See supra text accompanying notes 287–88. 
369 See supra Part II.A–B. 
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CONCLUSION 
While there are several causes to drug shortages, the common 
effect is the risk to patient care. The number and frequency of 
shortages has risen dramatically over the past five years. The 
repercussions of shortages adversely affect hospitals and other 
healthcare providers’ ability to treat patients. The unavailability of 
certain drugs has required healthcare providers to cancel 
interventions, administer less effective second-line alternatives, and 
purchase drugs through the gray market. 
To date, administrative, legislative, and industry approaches to 
address shortages have focused on the symptoms. The FDA’s revised 
manufacturer notice requirements and the multi-stakeholder ARI 
initiative to share drug production information may aid in addressing 
shortages. However, these measures will not address the root cause. 
The solution to ending shortages lies in removing the economic 
and regulatory obstacles that prevent manufacturers from achieving 
profit margins sufficient to produce certain needed medicines. 
Legislative action to restructure the MMA’s reimbursement system is 
necessary. Government agencies should conduct a thorough 
investigation of GPO contract activities. If appropriate based on the 
findings, Congress should repeal the safe harbor provisions to ensure 
free-market competition among manufacturers. Manufacturers should 
build on the multiparty industry collaboration that created the ARI to 
approach the FDA about working together to develop customized 
incentive packages in exchange for manufacturer commitments to 
meet certain production and quality levels. The appeal of this 
approach is that it has the potential to provide what has been largely 
absent—willing manufacturers. 
The U.S. government spends trillions of dollars each year 
subsidizing healthcare so more people can receive medical treatment. 
Advancements in chemotherapy and other drugs allow physicians to 
treat and cure several types of diseases that would have been fatal a 
few years ago. The most pernicious aspect of drug shortages is that 
they jeopardize, and in some cases eliminate, patients’ access to those 
lifesaving drugs. This Article proposes solutions to ensure patients 
have access to the right medicine at the right time. 
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